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Robin Hood Politics: An Analysis of Wealth Redistributive Policies and the 
Impact of Political Donations 
 
Marley R. Dizney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research addresses the impact of political donations on wealth distributive 
policies and demonstrates an alarming ideological divide along class lines within 
the Republican Party. Professor Bruce Larson was a mentor throughout this 
investigative process. 
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ABSTRACT 
Both Democrats and Republicans have taken strong positions on wealth 
redistribution. But is there variance within the parties? I hypothesize that while 
moderate non-donors and moderate donors will favor increases in federal 
spending for such policies at similar rates, both liberal and conservative donors 
will be less likely to favor spending due to attachment to their personal wealth. 
This paper analyzes the differences in support for increasing the budgets of five 
wealth redistributive policies while controlling for political donations: public 
schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security. The research 
finds that moderates and moderate donors support do not differ. Liberal non-
donors are more likely to favor increases in spending for public school and Social 
Security, while their donor counterparts favor childcare. Conservative donors are 
consistently less likely than non-donors to favor increases in spending on wealth 
redistributive policies. These findings expose a clear class split amongst 
conservatives and indicates a concerning divide between the Republican political 
elite and the constituents they are supposed to represent.  
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As political parties have become increasingly polarized, so too have many 
politicians’ stances on individual issues. The Republican Party has made it clear 
that they are staunchly against large-scale wealth redistribution, while the 
Democratic Party has made this idea part of the fabric of their party’s platform. Is 
there a clear split only between the parties, or do divisions exist within them? 
Donors tend to be wealthier than the average voter and therefore may have 
different values when it comes to wealth redistributive policies. While it may be 
obvious to assume that liberals will be in favor of wealth redistribution and 
conservatives against it, is there a difference in the level of support for such 
policies between donors and non-donors?  
 This distinction is important because it may reveal that elected officials 
favor the views of their donating constituents over those of non-donating 
constituents. In a political era dominated by campaign contributions, it is critical 
to understand how money affects the policies politicians choose to pursue and 
support. Additionally, wealthier donors may not understand the importance of 
wealth redistributive policies such as aid to the poor, welfare, and Social Security 
because they have never had to rely on it. On a more egalitarian note, it is 
important that all voices are represented in politics in order to ensure that its 
outcomes are representative of its people.  
 This research seeks to identify disparities within political ideologies as 
they pertain to wealth redistributive policies. I hypothesize that while moderate 
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non-donors and moderate donors will favor increases in federal spending for such 
policies at similar rates, both liberal donors and conservative donors will be less 
likely to favor spending than liberal non-donors and conservative non-donors due 
to attachment to their personal wealth. This paper analyzes the differences in 
support for increasing the budgets of five wealth redistributive policies while 
controlling for political donations: public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, 
childcare, and Social Security. The research finds that moderates’ and moderate 
donors’ levels of support do not differ. Liberal non-donors are more likely to 
favor increases in spending for public school and Social Security, while their 
donor counterparts are more likely to favor an increase in spending for childcare. 
Conservative donors are consistently less likely than non-donors to favor 
increases in spending on wealth redistributive policies. These findings expose 
slight differences between liberals non-donors and liberal donors, but more 
significantly, a glaring class split amongst conservatives.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Wealth redistribution was one of the most salient topics of the 2016 presidential 
election. From the left, Senator Bernie Sanders championed redistribution from 
the top 1% to the rest of the country, whose income had largely stagnated. From 
the right, Donald Trump campaigned on tax cuts that would redistribute wealth 
back to middle-class voters. While the issue was addressed from both the 
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Democratic and Republican parties, the two sides of the aisle spoke about the 
issue with different targets for the redistributive efforts and different means by 
which to achieve these goals. Schlozman, Verba and Brady argue that policy 
outcomes are more responsive to high-income voters, who make up the majority 
of political donors (2012). This literature review seeks to reconcile scholarly 
research on wealth redistribution and party polarization to identify the effects, if 
any, of donors on such policy outcomes leading up to the 2016 presidential 
election.  
 Low-income voters are traditionally more likely to have a left-leaning 
political ideology around the world. However, they are less likely to align 
themselves with the left if non-economic party polarization is high. Even if it is 
against their economic interests, low-income voters are often pulled towards the 
right by moral polarization (Finseraas 2009, 296). Henning Finseraas notes that 
“anti-redistributive rightist parties wishing to reduce the extent of redistribution” 
may find distancing themselves from the left on social issues to be an efficient 
strategy in gaining votes (2009, 298). Recently, there has been a global 
conservative shift when it comes to wealth redistribution. Matthew Luttig 
analyzes data presented by Lupu and Pontusson and finds that changes in the 
structure of inequality results in more conservative ideological positions on 
wealth redistribution (Luttig 2013, 817). However, this shift was not consistent 
across all income quintiles. When the ratio between lower quintiles is increased, 
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that quintile becomes more supportive of redistribution. When the ratio between 
higher income quintiles is increased, the highest income quintile becomes three 
times less supportive of redistribution than the lowest income is supportive of it 
(Luttig 2013, 817). That being said, this study was conducted on 14 developed 
countries; the United States was found to be the only outlier. This could be 
because of the U.S.’s exceptionally high concentration of racial minorities in the 
bottom income quintile (Lupu and Pontusson 2011, 329). 
 The U.S could be the outlier because its citizens generally have a positive 
view of people at the low end of this inequality. Bartels finds that, overall, 
Americans give “poor people” an average favorability rating of 73% over “rich 
people”, who score an average of 60% (2008, 36). It should be noted that while 
Americans have a positive view of poor people in general, this view is racially 
charged and tied to an idea of “deserving” versus “undeserving” poor people 
(Gilens 2009). Schneider and Ingram explain that these two categories of people 
have been placed into two socially constructed groups. The “deserving” poor are 
placed in a category that has a positive social construction, but weak political 
power. The “undeserving” poor share weak political power due to a negative 
social construction (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335-337). This makes it difficult 
for either group to have any effect on policy outcome, and furthermore makes 
poor people rely on more powerful groups to craft the policy surrounding their 
group. 
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Ideals of political and economic equality have long differed in the 
American psyche. Jennifer Hochschild finds that Americans believe in strict 
equality in a political sense, but view “economic freedom as an equal chance to 
become unequal” (Bartels 2008, 28). This results in conflict between firmly held 
egalitarian beliefs and support for policies that exacerbate inequality (Bartels 
2008, 29). Norton and Ariely find that while Americans prefer some degree of 
inequality to perfect economic equality, most Americans vastly underestimate the 
level of existing wealth inequality and construct far more equitable wealth 
distributions in their ideal country (2011, 10). In their survey, Norton and Ariely 
find that citizens who voted for Senator John Kerry in the 2004 election were 
more likely than former President George W. Bush voters to report a higher 
percentage of wealth held by the top 20%. Moreover, when Kerry voters were 
asked to construct an ideal wealth distribution, they gave the top 20% of wealth 
holders less than Bush voters did. Bush voters estimated that the top 20% holds 
less wealth than they actually do, and in their ideal wealth distribution, would 
hold more (2011, 11). These findings indicate that while egalitarian beliefs are 
strong in most Americans, disagreements about the causes of inequality may 
hinder chances for consensus (Norton and Ariely 2011, 12).  
Regardless of the causes of inequality, the existing disparity significantly 
favors the rich when it comes to political representation. Martin Gilens provides 
evidence that policy outcomes of the United States government are more 
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responsive to high-income voters “especially in policy domains where the 
opinions of rich and poor diverge” (Bonica et al. 2012, 118). This is significant 
when considering that Republicans are more sympathetic to tax burdens on the 
rich while Democrats are more sympathetic to tax relief for the poor (Bartels 
2008, 41). Such a split could lead to significant tax cuts for the rich when 
Republicans are in power, followed by increases in the budget for social safety net 
programs when Democrats are in power due to fundamental beliefs held by each 
party.  
The Republican Party values individualism above all else, while the 
Democratic Party values both individualism and egalitarianism, creating potential 
incongruity not present in the Republican Party’s message (Ura and Ellis 2012, 
280). However, both parties have been found to become more liberal in response 
to growing income inequality (Ura and Ellis 2012, 285). The reaction of the two 
parties is not the same; Ura and Ellis find an asymmetric party polarization driven 
predominantly by the preferences of the Republican Party (2012, 288). While the 
authors note that they implicitly neglected the role of political elites in shaping 
polarization, other authors attempt to fill the gaps in information (Ura and Ellis 
2012, 289). Bonica et al. note that rich Americans have been able to influence 
“electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions, 
lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats.” (2013, 
105) The authors note that it is difficult to gauge the effect of monetary 
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contributions to Democrats on their positions on wealth redistribution, largely 
because the party’s donating base has recently shifted from the traditional small 
number of large donors to a more grassroots system of fundraising (Bonica et al. 
2013, 113). 
Grossman and Hopkins argue that while the parties have clear differences 
on policy issues regarding wealth redistribution, most individual Americans are 
symbolic conservatives but operational liberals (2016). In the context of 
favorability towards poor people, this could mean that Americans are 
symbolically against spending to the poor, yet when presented with a specific 
policy (such as an increase in public school spending), they indicate that they are 
in favor of such a policy. While political ideology is a critical factor in 
understanding the support of wealth redistribution, education levels also play a 
role. When broken down by education levels, those with the lowest levels of 
education were more sympathetic toward the tax burden on rich people and 
unsympathetic toward the tax burden on poor people (Bartels 2008, 41). This 
could be because people with low education levels are less aware of how large the 
wealth disparity is.  
Bonica et al. theorize that either party could implement policies to 
ameliorate the recent sharp rise in inequality, but do not due to extreme 
polarization between the parties, lack of voter participation, feedback from high-
income campaign contributors and the nature of political institutions (2013, 121). 
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This is underlined by an embrace of free market capitalism from both major 
parties in the U.S., which results in lower support for social safety nets that rely 
on wealth redistribution. The parties differ, however, in their general ideological 
drifts. Republicans have become “sharply” more conservative while Democrats 
have shifted only slightly left (Bonica et al. 2013, 106). Even with the shift to the 
left in the Democratic Party, the party has shifted away from social welfare 
policies and towards policies that “target ascriptive identities of race, ethnicity, 
gender, and sexual orientation.” (Bonica et al. 2013, 107) These factors are not 
mutually exclusive with wealth redistribution. In fact, racial minorities are often 
the groups that would benefit most from social welfare policies as they make up 
the largest percentages of the lowest income quintiles.  
The Great Recession of 2008 provided ample political movement on the 
issue of wealth inequality that was ultimately unrealized. As the inequality 
increases, the real value of the minimum wage, taxes on income from capital, the 
top marginal income tax rates, and estate taxes have all fallen (McCarty, Poole, 
Rosenthal 2006, 118). Additionally, there has been little to no political support for 
reforms of the financial sector, substantial reduction of mortgage foreclosures, or 
expansion of investment in human capital of children from low-income 
households (Bonica et al. 2013, 108). Luttig argues that as economic inequality 
increases, support for wealth redistribution policies decreases as those who are in 
a position to influence policy stand to lose as a result of welfare-enhancing 
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policies (2013, 812). This would imply that as contributors to politics become 
richer, their incentive to give to candidates who support wealth redistribution 
declines, making lower-income voters’ voices muffled below the money.  
As party leaders have moved towards extremes, parties as a whole have 
cued voters to vote based on their income (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 
92). Relative income is a statistically significant factor in Republican partisanship. 
The Republican Party has increased the size of its base by moving away from 
redistributive policies as income stratification of voters intensifies (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 82, 108). McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal write in 
2006 that increases in net worth, wealth, home ownership, and securities 
ownership could be explanatory factors in the diminished desire for social 
insurance and the growth in size of the Republican Party (108). This growth was 
accompanied by a decrease in the party’s favorability outlook on wealth 
redistribution efforts. Despite the right’s distinguished position on social issues, 
from the 1960s to the early 2000s, partisanship by income led to a “rich-poor 
cleavage” between the parties (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 74). While 
every policy issue could be considered from an economic perspective, recent 
elections have focused more on social and moral aspects of myriad issues, such as 
the social issue of increased immigration and the moral issue of legalizing gay 
marriage. Hacker and Pierson highlight the decline of labor unions as a means of 
shaping public opinion among working class voters. They also cite the 
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Democratic Party’s shift from populist elements in order to appeal to affluent 
social liberals, leaving the Republican Party a clear opportunity to recruit those 
voters with promises of “individual gains” from low taxes and small government 
(Nagel and Smith 2013, 162). This may cause low-income voters to vote against 
economic policies that may benefit them, like wealth redistribution (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 96). 
Democrats are more likely than Republicans to sponsor bills such as 
student loan forgiveness or increases in the minimum wage that are aimed at 
addressing economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014, 4-5). Non-white 
members of both parties in Congress are more likely to sponsor legislation that 
addresses economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014, 4). When 
deconstructed, Kraus and Callaghan discover that while Republicans tend not to 
sponsor legislation that addresses wealth redistribution regardless of their 
personal wealth, Democrats are more likely to sponsor the same legislation if they 
are personally of lower wealth (2014, 4). While there was no significant effect for 
gender in Congress as a whole, Democratic women are more likely to sponsor 
legislation addressing economic inequality than their male counterparts (Kraus 
and Callaghan 2014, 4). However, as Congress has continued to be dominated by 
wealthy white men, the legislative branch has “punched the gas pedal” to 
accelerate inequality (Carnes 2016, 107).  
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Despite efforts by the Democratic Party, low-income Americans have 
steadily been shifting right in their political views. Katherine J. Cramer finds that 
this is a result of the increase in national economic inequality. Part of this stems 
from what Cramer labels “rural consciousness,” a mindset adopted by many rural 
dwellers who feel ignored by politics and deprived of the resources they feel they 
deserve (2016, 5). She also points out that the Republican Party was built upon 
anti-New Deal, and therefore anti-wealth redistributive, policies. It is in the 
interest of the party that “attention to class to be diverted to attention to race” 
(Cramer 2016, 16). Most importantly, Cramer argues, is the composition of the 
poor in the United States, who are predominantly racial minorities. This means 
that middle-income voters lack a psychological connection to the poor and are 
therefore less likely to support a redistribution of resources to them (Cramer 2016, 
17).  
Regardless of where low-income citizens lie on the political spectrum, 
they historically do not turn out to vote in large numbers (Bonica et al. 2013, 
110). Perhaps as a result of this, vote-seeking candidates are more responsive to 
political activists than to the median voter (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 
261). This is important because on average, political activists are wealthier and 
less likely to support wealth redistribution policies than the average citizen. Many 
of these political activists donate money to their party and candidates of that 
party, although the income of these donors differs greatly between parties; there is 
16 
 
a party split between Democrats and Republicans of $76,000 to $118,000, 
respectively (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 256).  
This gap has a compelling connection to Schlozman, Verba, and Brady’s 
observations on perspectives of economic inequality and political polarization. 
The authors note that “the ideological shift among Democrats derives from the 
increasing liberalism of the most affluent Democrats” (2012, 259). It would then 
seem to follow that party activists, who tend to be wealthier than the average 
party member, would drive the ideological positions of party members as a whole 
to the left. Bonica et al. note that contributions from party activists may have a 
significant impact on legislation that would address economic inequality, such as 
a higher tax rate on carried interest income received by private equity investors 
(2013, 118). Because Republican policies are typically more sympathetic towards 
tax burdens on the rich while Democratic policies are more sympathetic towards 
poor people, their responses to economic inequality will differ significantly 
(Bartels 2008, 41).    
Partisans do not always follow the lead of party activists, however. In 
2012, Republican voters supported tax increases on the wealthy while party 
leaders publicly opposed such legislation (Hershey 2014, 252). However, 
historically speaking, the official party position reflects the view of the majority 
of partisans in the electorate. Party positions can go so far as to obfuscate 
objective conditions, like inflation, that surround economic inequality (Hershey 
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2014, 253-255). Logan Hershey finds that “on a range of issues, scholars find that 
awareness of elite-level differences and the presence of elite debate on an issue 
are the drivers of opinion change in the mass public.” He continues, saying that a 
“major reshuffling of the political environment” could “disrupt the relatively 
stable party attachments in the electorate.” (Hershey 2014, 256) It could be argued 
that in the past few decades, a rise of extremes within each party indicates a future 
such reshuffling. This is caused in part by competitive primaries, in which 
incumbents must become more extreme in order to capture the maximum number 
of votes.  
This shift to extremes manifested in the 2016 presidential election. This 
election cycle was revolutionary in the rhetoric utilized to mobilize voters. On the 
Republican side, Donald Trump campaigned on bringing back American jobs 
from abroad in order to address the sentiments of economic insecurity in the 
middle class. The Democratic response to rising economic inequality was to 
address equal pay across genders, the stagnant minimum wage, universal 
healthcare, and campaign finance reform. Before the 2016 presidential election, 
the Republican Party was characterized, and perhaps caricatured, for being 
supported by predominantly rich, white men, but Donald Trump enfranchised 
low-income voters with many of his stances on social issues. Former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, disenfranchised many low-income voters 
with her connections to high-income institutions like Goldman Sachs. This 
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upended the traditional alignment of low-income voters with the Democratic 
Party. However, it is improbable that this shift was sudden or a one-time fluke. 
Rather, it seems more likely that low-income voters have gradually been shifting 
right, a trend that was overlooked by elites as they continued to favor the voices 
of their wealthier constituents.  
Neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties have made significant 
efforts to craft policy aimed at a significant redistribution of wealth. Political 
inaction could be due to extreme party polarization, contributions from wealthy 
donors who do not support redistributive efforts, or a combination of the two in 
which donors cause polarized gridlock on this issue (Finseraas 2009; Schlozman, 
Verba and Brady 2012). Although factors of gender, race, and ethnicity on 
ideological positions regarding wealth redistribution efforts is outside the scope of 
this paper, it is important to note that white, wealthy men in Congress are the least 
likely to support redistribution efforts (Kraus and Callaghan 2014). There appears 
to be a gap in literature that directly addresses the influence that party elites exert 
to steer conversation and policy outcomes on wealth redistribution. In light of the 
historic 2016 presidential election, it is necessary to analyze who steers the 
conversation on redistributive policies in order to assess whether or not the elite 
stance is truly representative of the American people. 
 
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
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This paper seeks to answer the question: is there a difference in levels of support 
for wealth redistributive policies between donors and non-donors of similar 
ideologies? Because donors tend to be wealthier than the average voter, it is 
logical to assume that they may be more conservative in their beliefs on wealth 
redistribution. This is because many wealthy donors believe that they stand to lose 
some of their personal wealth by supporting such policies. Additionally, many 
donors have never benefitted directly from programs that redistribute wealth and 
therefore cannot attest to their ability to help. I posit that donors will generally be 
less likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than non-donors. However, I 
predict that the differences will vary within each ideological category. For this 
reason, I propose three hypotheses regarding the three political ideology 
categories utilized in this study. 
Hypothesis 1: Liberal donors will be less likely to favor wealth 
redistributive policies than liberal non-donors. 
 Because liberal donors are typically wealthier than their non-donor 
counterparts, I predict that the donors will be less likely to favor wealth 
redistributive policies. While donors will preach redistributive policies and 
practices as a part of the larger party platform, they will de facto favor them at 
lower rates than the rest of their party. While Schlozman, Verba, and Brady found 
that Democratic elites are driving the party to the left, I predict that this shift will 
manifest in issues other than wealth redistribution (2012, 259). These findings 
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have the potential to expose a symbolic liberalism within elites in the Democratic 
Party that breaks down to more moderate views when individual items in the 
federal budget are considered.  
Hypothesis 2: Moderate donors will be just as likely to favor 
wealth redistributive policies as moderate non-donors. 
 As the American political party system becomes more polarized, so too do 
donors. This leaves very few donors in the middle of the two parties. Moreover, 
donors often give money to certain candidates and causes because they believe 
strongly in one side or another. Donors also tend to give money in the hopes of 
winning, which leads them to candidates from the two established parties that 
stand a chance at winning national elections. I predict that because many 
moderates do not have strong feelings regarding wealth redistributive policies, 
they and the donors in their category will not have significantly different views.  
Hypothesis 3: Conservative donors will be less likely to favor 
wealth redistributive policies than non-donor conservatives. 
 Conservatives and the Republican Party have positioned themselves 
staunchly against wealth redistributive policies. While most conservative donors 
have never benefitted directly from these policies, many of their constituents 
have. For this reason, I believe that conservative non-donors will be more likely 
to favor wealth redistributive policies when they are framed as individual 
programs (for example, Social Security, childcare, welfare) as opposed to a 
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progressive tax shifting wealth because they are personally familiar with the 
programs. Conservative donors, on the other hand, have the privilege to take a 
strict ideological stance against these programs because they do not rely on any of 
them. Strict conservatism is a “system-justifying ideology, in that it preserves the 
status quo and provides intellectual and moral justification for maintaining 
inequality in society.” (Jost et al. 2003, 63) I therefore predict that conservative 
donors will be strong advocates for the status quo when it comes to wealth 
redistribution policies.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The data in this paper comes from the 2012 American National Elections Study 
(ANES) Time Series Study. The unit of analysis in this study is individuals and 
the cases are respondents to the survey. 5,916 respondents were surveyed, so 
N=5,916. The dependent variable for this survey was ideological placement, for 
which survey respondents were sorted into the following categories: liberal, 
moderate, and conservative. These categories came from the NES 7-point liberal-
conservative scale. While this does not measure Democrats, Independents, and 
Republicans exactly, we can assume that most liberal donors will give to 
Democrats and conservative donors to Republicans. Measuring ideological 
positioning is a more helpful variable than party identification because it allows 
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for an analysis of personal symbolic ideological placement that can then be 
compared to operational ideology.  
 There are five distinct independent variables. Because the term “wealth 
redistribution” is politically charged, a direct question regarding favorability 
towards relevant policies would most likely illustrate a clear partisan split. 
Instead, I decided to measure five policies that redistribute wealth in various, 
concrete ways. These variables include government funding for public schools, 
welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security. In the survey, all 
respondents were asked whether they thought the federal budget for this program 
should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same. Each response received a 
score of zero if the respondent answered “decreased” or “kept about the same.” A 
score of one was applied to respondents that answered “increased.” This scoring 
system is employed because keeping federal aid of these programs the same 
decreases the real value of the budget with inflation, thereby decreasing the 
funding over the long term. These five variables were then compiled into a 
variable henceforth referred to as “social welfare.” Each response to the question 
(should federal spending on [welfare variable] be decreased, kept the same, or 
increased?) received a score of zero, one, or two, respectively. The social welfare 
gives respondents a score from zero to ten based on the sum of their answers to 
the five aforementioned variables, measuring their overall favorability towards 
wealth redistributive policies.  
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This study controlled for political donations. If an individual responded 
yes to giving to individual political candidates, political parties, or both, they were 
considered political donors. This allows for a deeper analysis that goes beyond 
partisan differences in support for wealth redistributive policies. Controlling for 
political donations also allows for a separation of the party elites’ ideology from 
non-donating party members, who may have different stances on the same issues. 
Identifying any differences will give credit to the argument that party elites 
manipulate candidates they donate to while the average voter must adapt to the 
changing party (Hershey 2014, 256).  
The analysis will begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of 
social welfare in order to analyze the difference between parties and their donors 
on a general level. From there, each individual contributing variable to the social 
welfare category (Social Security, welfare, childcare, public school, and aid to the 
poor) will be analyzed via logistic regressions. One general logistic regression 
will be done for all six categories of survey respondents: liberal, liberal donor, 
moderate, moderate donor, conservative, and conservative donor. From there, a 
logistic regression will be performed to analyze the differences between the 
donors and non-donors of each specified ideology.  
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
General 
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Table A (see Appendix) illustrates the frequency of liberals, liberal donors, 
moderates, moderate donors, conservatives, and conservative donors. For each 
ideological affiliation, there were significantly lower numbers of donors than 
there were non-donors. Table 1 demonstrates the average social welfare score of 
each of the six groups. Each survey respondent received a score of zero, one, or 
two based on their support for a decrease, maintenance of the same, or increase, 
respectively, in the federal budget for each separate category included in the 
social welfare scale (public school, welfare, childcare, aid to the poor, and Social 
Security). A mean score of zero indicates that the group wants to decrease the 
federal budget in all measured aspects of social welfare and ten means the group 
wants to increase the budget for all five categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 1: Mean score of the six categories of 
respondents on the social welfare scale. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 6.952584 1460 1.926986 
Liberal Donors 7.118597 268 2.005978 
Moderate 6.231209 932 2.088464 
Moderate Donors 5.982533 77 2.041533 
Conservative 5.117015 2209 2.434877 
Conservative Donor 3.832257 277 2.537898 
Total 5.876123 5221 2.412499 
 
Based on Table 1, it is possible to see the polarization in the liberal and 
conservative donor groups. Liberal donors receive the highest average score of 
7.12 while their non-donor counterparts receive a 6.95. On the other side, 
conservative donors receive the lowest mean score of 3.83, which is lower than 
their non-donor counterparts’ score of 5.11. Moderate non-donors received a 
mean score of 6.23, while moderate donors averaged a more conservative score of 
5.98. When an OLS regression is performed, it is possible to see the significant 
difference between these means (Table B). Liberals vary significantly from 
moderates, conservatives, and conservative donors. However, they do not vary 
significantly from their donor counterparts (Table C). Table D illustrates a lack 
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of significant difference between moderates and moderate donors. Table E, on 
the other hand, shows a significant difference between conservatives and 
conservative donors, with conservative donors scoring lower on the social welfare 
scale.   
Public School 
When broken down into individual categories, the differences between ideologies 
and the donors that adhere to them becomes clearer. Respondents were asked if 
they thought federal spending on public schools should be increased, decreased, 
or kept about the same. If the response was “decreased” or “kept about the same,” 
the answer was assigned a zero. If the response was “increased,” the answer was 
assigned a one. Table F illustrates the odds ratio of each of the six categories of 
respondents’ views to changes in federal spending on public schools. An odds 
ratio conveys “by how much the odds of the outcome of interest occurring change 
for each unit change in the independent variable” (Pollock and Edwards 2018, 
168). Table 2 makes clear that liberals (with an odds ratio of 4.115, as seen in 
Table F) are much more likely to support increasing the federal budget for public 
schools than any other group.  
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Table 2: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
 the federal budget for public schools. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.8045086 1480 0.3967125 
Liberal donor 0.7431517 270 0.4377072 
Moderate 0.6287281 942 0.4834016 
Moderate donor 0.6947676 84 0.4632562 
Conservative 0.5335028 2281 0.4989857 
Conservative donor 0.2971352 286 0.4577970 
Total 0.6258352 5344 0.4839518 
 
Moderate donors (with a score of 1.344) are the only other group to favor an 
increase. Liberal donors, moderates, conservatives, and conservative donors 
favored either maintenance of the status quo or decrease in the federal budget.  
Table G gives the results from a logistic regression that considers all six 
categories of respondents with “liberal” serving as the intercept. It is clear from 
the P-values (“Pr(>|t|)” on the table) that there is a significant difference between 
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Does this mean that donors do not hold 
significantly different opinions on federal spending on public schools from 
liberals? This seems improbable. It more likely means that being a donor does not 
make an individual hold significantly different opinions than their non-donating 
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counterparts. In order to ensure that this interpretation was correct, the data from 
Table G was broken down into three separate logistic regressions (Table H, Table 
I, Table J) to measure the significance in difference between liberals and liberal 
donors, moderates and moderate donors, and conservative and conservative 
donors, respectively. Liberals and liberal donors vary with a p-value of 0.1 (a 
value just short of conventional levels of statistical significance), with liberal non-
donors being less likely to favor an increase in the federal budget for public 
schools (Table H). Table I illustrates a lack of significant difference between 
moderates and moderate non-donors. In Table J, it is possible to see that 
conservatives and conservative donors differ significantly in their opinions on 
federal spending on public schools. Conservative donors are significantly more 
likely to favor keeping the federal budget about the same or decreasing it than 
their non-donor counterparts.  
Welfare 
Interestingly, all groups scored below 0.26 (on a scale of zero to one) when asked 
about an increase in the federal budget for welfare (Table 3). This ranged from a 
0.252 from liberal donors to a 0.056 from conservative donors, an illustration of 
the argument that donors tend to be more extreme in their views than their non-
donor counterparts. This implies a general lack of support for welfare spending or 
dissatisfaction with the program as a whole. Table 3 shows a comparison of the 
means across the six groups of respondents.  
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Table 3: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for welfare. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.21592363 1473 0.4116013 
Liberal donor 0.25187830 270 0.4348984 
Moderate 0.13303709 942 0.3397952 
Moderate donor 0.09268711 83 0.2917518 
Conservative 0.07599589 2267 0.2650500 
Conservative donor 0.05636867 286 0.2310367 
Total 0.13294683 5321 0.3395492 
 
The odds ratio for responses to welfare spending illustrate that liberal 
donors have the most positive response to an increase in spending, although their 
score is still low (Table K). Similar to the response for federal spending on public 
schools, Table L shows a highly significant difference between liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives when it comes to welfare. Tables M, N, and O 
illustrate that there is no significant difference between liberals and liberal donors, 
moderates and moderate donors, and conservatives and conservative donors, 
respectively. However, it is interesting to note that not a single category of donors 
received a significantly different score than their non-donating counterparts. This 
could be because of effectiveness in messaging from the parties that represent 
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liberals and conservatives. More likely, it is indicative of an overall lack of 
support for the program.  
 The results from the logistic regression on welfare seem to tie back into 
the argument posed by Gilens that poor people can either be “deserving” or 
“undeserving” (1999). The hoops that people must jump through to obtain welfare 
benefits (for example, drug testing) seem to imply that they are not trusted to use 
the system properly and therefore “undeserving” of such wealth redistribution 
efforts. Alternatively, Schneider and Ingram would argue that welfare recipients 
have been placed in a socially constructed group that is both viewed negatively 
and given weak political power, leading those with power to not support the 
program as a whole (1993).  
Aid to the Poor 
Similar to the results for welfare spending, liberal donors and conservative donors 
represented the extremes on the mean scores scale in regard to the federal budget 
for aid to the poor (Table 4).  
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Table 4: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for aid to the poor. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.4953054 1480 0.5001469 
Liberal donor 0.5307258 271 0.4999786 
Moderate 0.4008793 943 0.4903366 
Moderate donor 0.3815680 84 0.4886966 
Conservative 0.2499604 2259 0.4330857 
Conservative donor 0.1541460 287 0.3617192 
Total 0.3561007 5325 0.4788905 
 
The odds ratio for this data indicates that the odds of favoring an increase in 
spending on the poor for liberal donors was 15% higher than that of a non-liberal 
donor, while the odds of a conservative donor were 85% lower than a non-
conservative donor (Table P). Table Q illustrates significant differences between 
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. When broken down by ideology, logistic 
regressions yielded no significant different between liberals and liberal donors, 
nor between moderates and moderate donors (Table R, Table S). There was a 
strong significant difference between conservatives and conservative donors (with 
a P-value below 0.01), in which conservative donors were less likely to favor an 
increase in the federal budget for aid to the poor (Table T).   
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Childcare 
When asked about federal spending on childcare, the groups again illustrated 
significant differences in their values. Once again, liberal donors had the highest 
means score while conservative donors had the lowest mean score (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for childcare. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.4628661 1481 0.4987876 
Liberal donor 0.5404033 270 0.4992918 
Moderate 0.3250649 944 0.4686474 
Moderate donor 0.2300255 77 0.4236041 
Conservative 0.2494619 2261 0.4327974 
Conservative donor 0.1507043 286 0.3583885 
Total 0.3314778 5317 0.4707887 
 
The odds ratio for federal spending on child care reinforces this information, 
illustrating that liberal donors are the only group that are more likely to favor an 
increase in spending than not (Table U). Table V illustrates strong differences 
between most of the groups. When broken down by ideology, it is shown that 
liberal donors are more likely to favor an increase in federal spending on 
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childcare than their non-donor counterparts, although the P-value falls just short 
of conventional levels of statistical significance (Table W). As with the previous 
variables, there was no difference between moderates and moderate donors on the 
issue of child care (Table X). However, there was a highly significant difference 
between conservatives and conservative donors, with conservative donors being 
less likely to favor an increase in federal spending on child care (Table Y).  
Social Security 
Interestingly, liberal donors did not score the highest when it came to federal 
spending on Social Security (Table 6). In fact, liberals were the only group to 
have an odds ratio above a value of one, meaning that the odds of a liberal 
respondent supporting an increase in the budget for Social Security were 16.8% 
higher than a non-liberal (Table Z). Unlike welfare, Social Security is not a 
means-tested program and as such, it not typically viewed as a program for the 
poor. Unlike welfare, the beneficiaries of Social Security are not a part of a 
negatively viewed social group. Therefore, the program as a whole receives 
higher favorability ratings. 
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Table 6: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for Social Security. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.5387621 1474 0.4986645 
Liberal donor 0.4629038 269 0.4995501 
Moderate 0.5311211 943 0.4992955 
Moderate donor 0.4232112 84 0.4970192 
Conservative 0.4491807 2269 0.4975204 
Conservative donor 0.2531787 284 0.4356008 
Total 0.4783288 5322 0.4995771 
 
While most groups responded close to the mean of 0.478, there was 
significant variance among ideological categories (Table AA). For liberals, non-
donors were slightly less likely to support an increase in the federal budget for 
Social Security (Table AB). For moderate donors and non-donors, there was no 
significant difference (Table AC). Conservatives had the largest and most 
significant differences. Conservative non-donors hovered just slightly below the 
mean of 0.478, but conservative donors were significantly less likely to favor an 
increase in spending on Social Security at 0.253 (Table AD).  
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DISCUSSION 
When analyzed by variable (public school, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and 
Social Security), it is simple to see that there are significant differences in 
ideology between liberals, moderates, and conservatives. However, do the 
differences persist when controlling for political donations? The answer for 
moderates is a resounding no. There was not a single category in which moderates 
held significantly different beliefs from their donating counterparts. It is important 
to note that the number of “moderate donor” responses was always the lowest of 
the six categories. This could be because donors tend to give money because of 
strongly held beliefs that generally represent strong, polarized views (Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady 2012). This results in the donors picking a party that will 
champion their strongly held beliefs, which generally leads them to the 
Democratic or Republican Parties. These results strongly support Hypothesis 2, 
which predicted that moderate donors would be just as likely to favor wealth 
redistributive policies as moderate non-donors.  
The differences between liberals and liberal donors are more pronounced. 
There were no significant differences between liberals and liberal donors in 
regard to support for an increase in federal spending on welfare or aid to the poor. 
In two categories (public school and Social Security), liberal donors were less 
likely (with a P-value of 0.1, which falls short of conventional standards of 
significance) to favor an increase in federal spending when compared to their non-
36 
 
donor counterparts. This could be because there are fewer donors than non-donors 
who directly benefit from these services. Wealthy donors may have gone to or 
have children in private schools. Additionally, they may not need to rely on Social 
Security. However, donors were more likely to favor an increase in federal 
spending on childcare (again at the 0.1 level). This could be because wealthier 
donors with children would directly benefit from such a service. These findings 
do not support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that liberal donors would be less 
likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than liberal non-donors. While this 
was true for public school and Social Security, it did not hold true across all five 
categories.  
Conservatives, however, had statistically significant differences in levels 
of support for social welfare spending than their donating counterparts. There was 
only one category in which conservatives and conservative donors did not have 
significantly different values: welfare spending. In the categories of federal 
spending on public school, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security, 
conservative donors were consistently less likely to favor an increase in spending. 
This strongly supports Hypothesis 3, which posited that conservative donors 
would be less likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than non-donor 
conservatives. The implications of these findings are important in understanding 
how the Republican Party has shifted dramatically right over the past few decades 
while the Democratic Party has only gradually shifted left (Grossman and 
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Hopkins 2016). These findings indicate that conservative donors are controlling 
the direction of the party while non-donors’ more moderate views are being 
drowned out by party elites. This should be important to political scientists in 
understanding ideological trends on wealth redistributive policies and to elected 
officials who may not be representing their average constituents’ views on wealth 
redistributive policies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research asked if there was a significant difference between donors and non-
donors when it came to support for wealth redistributive policies. By scoring 
responses to the 2012 ANES Time Series Study for support of increased funding 
for public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security, it was 
possible to run logistic regressions to determine whether such a significant 
difference exists. Because donors tend to be high-income voters, I posited that 
liberal donors and conservative donors would be less likely to support wealth 
redistributive policies than their non-donating counterparts due to an attachment 
to their personal wealth. That being said, because there are few causes that court 
moderate donors, I hypothesized that moderate donors and non-donors would not 
differ significantly in their views. I found that moderates and just as likely to 
favor wealth redistributive policies as moderate non-donors. Liberal donors are 
more likely to favor an increase in spending for childcare than liberal non-donors, 
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who are more likely to favor an increase in public school and Social Security 
spending. In every category but welfare spending, conservative donors were less 
likely to favor an increase in spending on wealth redistributive policies.  
These findings support McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s observation that 
the Republican Party has increased its base by moving away from redistributive 
policies (2006, 82, 108). This could be because, as Cramer argues, the 
composition of the poor in the United States results in a lack of connection 
between them and middle- and high-income voters (2016, 17). If middle- and 
high-income voters are the majority of party activists, and vote-seeking 
candidates are more responsive to party activists than the median voter, how do 
activists shape the policy outcomes regarding wealth redistribution (Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady 2012, 261)? This paper adds to existing literature by offering 
evidence that Republican elites want to shape these policies to be far more 
conservative than even conservative non-donors. Because Republicans are 
currently in control of the executive and legislative branches, they could use their 
power to make dramatic slashes to social safety net programs. Just as important is 
the contribution of further evidence of the class divide within the Republican 
Party that Democrats could exploit or—without external intervention—could 
cause a split between conservatives. 
Future research should consider utilizing additional dependent variables to 
federal budget spending on public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and 
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Social Security. Alternatively, a further analysis of the amount of money donated 
(as opposed to a binary “yes” or “no”) and the scaled effects on candidates’ 
positions on wealth redistribution could prove to be illuminating. Holding these 
findings to data from the 2016 presidential election could establish a trend in 
wealth redistribution policies as the issues become increasingly salient. The sheer 
amount of money in politics implies that political elites are out of touch with their 
poor constituents that would benefit the most from these policies. More 
importantly, the country as a whole would benefit if concrete steps were made to 
lift America’s lowest classes.     
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Frequency of the six categories of respondents. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Liberal 1525 25.778 28.362 
Liberal Donor 321 5.426 5.970 
Moderate 963 16.278 17.910 
Moderate donor 113 1.910 2.102 
Conservative 2143 36.224 39.855 
Conservative donor 312 5.274 5.802 
NA’s 539 9.111  
Total 5916 100.000 100.000 
 
 
Social Welfare Tables 
 
Table B: OLS regression results for social welfare by category of respondent. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) 6.95258 0.06740 103.157 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal donor 0.16601 0.18056 0.919 0.358 
Moderate -0.72137 0.11229 -6.424 1.44e-10 *** 
Moderate donor -0.24868 0.26684 -0.932 0.351 
Conservative -1.83557 0.09663 -18.996 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -1.28476 0.19820 -6.482 9.88e-11 *** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table C: OLS regression results for social welfare between liberal non-donors 
and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal 6.95258 0.06740 103.157 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal donor 0.16601 0.18056 0.919 0.358 
 
 
Table D: OLS regression results for social welfare between moderate non-donors 
and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderate 6.23121 0.08981 69.384 < 2e-16 *** 
Moderate donor -0.24868 0.26684 -0.932 0.351 
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Table E: OLS regression results for social welfare between conservative non-
donors and conservative donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservative 5.11701 0.06924 73.901 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -1.28476 0.19820 -6.482 9.88e-11 *** 
 
 
Public School Tables 
 
Table F: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
public schools. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 4.115 3.469 4.882 
Liberal donor 0.703 0.475 1.040 
Moderate 0.411 0.322 0.526 
Moderate donor 1.344 0.736 2.454 
Conservative 0.278 0.227 0.341 
Conservative donor 0.370 0.265 0.516 
 
 
Table G: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) 1.4147 0.0872 16.223 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal donor -0.3523 0.1996 -1.765 0.0776 . 
Moderate -0.8880 0.1256 -7.071 1.74e-12 *** 
Moderate donor 0.2957 0.3072 0.963 0.3357 
Conservative -1.2805 0.1043 -12.277 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -0.9952 0.1702 -5.847 5.31e-09 *** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table H: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal 1.4147 0.0872 16.223 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal Donors -0.3523 0.1996 -1.765 0.0776 . 
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Table I: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates 0.52676 0.09037 5.829 5.90e-09 *** 
Moderate Donors 0.29574 0.30717 0.963 0.335699 
 
 
Table J: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools between conservative non-donors and conservative 
donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives 0.13421 0.05722 2.346 0.019030* 
Conservative Donors -0.99519 0.17021 -5.847 5.31e-09*** 
 
 
Welfare Tables 
 
Table K: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
welfare. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 0.275 0.234 0.324 
Liberal donor 1.223 0.829 1.804 
Moderate 0.557 0.411 0.755 
Moderate donor 0.666 0.277 1.600 
Conservative 0.299 0.230 0.389 
Conservative donor 0.726 0.361 1.462 
 
 
Table L: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) -1.28958 0.08277 -15.580 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal Donor 0.20096 0.19843 1.013 0.311211 
Moderate -0.58479 0.15497 -3.773 0.000163 *** 
Moderate Donor -0.40689 0.44731 -0.910 0.363058 
Conservative -1.20846 0.13425 -9.002 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative Donor -0.31978 0.35679 -0.896 0.370144 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
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Table M: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal -1.28958 0.08277 -15.580 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal Donors 0.20096 0.19843 1.013 0.311211 
 
 
Table N: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates -1.8744 0.1310 -14.306 < 2e-16 *** 
Moderate Donors -0.4069 0.4473 -0.910 0.363058 
 
 
Table O: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare between conservative non-donors and conservative donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -2.4980 0.1057 -23.635 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.3198 0.3568 -0.896 0.370144 
 
 
Aid to the Poor Tables 
 
Table P: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on aid 
to the poor. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 0.981 0.855 1.127 
Liberal donor 1.152 0.828 1.603 
Moderate 0.682 0.545 0.853 
Moderate donor 0.922 0.516 1.648 
Conservative 0.340 0.281 0.410 
Conservative donor 0.547 0.367 0.816 
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Table Q: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) -0.01878 0.07045 -0.267 0.789830 
Liberal donor 0.14184 0.16841 0.842 0.399692 
Moderate -0.38302 0.11448 -3.346 0.000826 *** 
Moderate donor -0.08110 0.29641 -0.274 0.784408 
Conservative -1.08004 0.09641 -11.203 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -0.60362 0.20400 -2.959 0.003101 ** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table R: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal -0.01878 0.07045 -0.267 0.789830 
Liberal donor 0.14184 0.16841 0.842 0.399692 
 
 
Table S: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.  
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates -0.40180 0.09023 -4.453 8.63e-06 *** 
Moderate Donors -0.08110 0.29641 -0.274 0.784408 
 
 
Table T: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor between conservative non-donors and conservative 
donors.  
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -1.09882 0.06581 -16.696 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.60362 0.20400 -2.959 0.0031 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Childcare Tables 
 
Table U: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
childcare. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 0.862 0.751 0.989 
Liberal donor 1.364 0.981 1.899 
Moderate 0.559 0.445 0.702 
Moderate donor 0.620 0.345 1.115 
Conservative 0.386 0.319 0.466 
Conservative donor 0.534 0.353 0.806 
 
 
Table V: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) -0.14881 0.07045 -2.112 0.03472 * 
Liberal donor 0.31078 0.16861 1.843 0.06535 . 
Moderate -0.58178 0.11636 -5.000 5.92e-07 *** 
Moderate donor -0.47758 0.29920 -1.596 0.11050 
Conservative -0.95267 0.09640 -9.882 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -0.62760 0.21035 -2.984 0.00286 ** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table W: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal -0.14881 0.07045 -2.112 0.03472 * 
Liberal Donors 0.31078 0.16861 1.843 0.06535 . 
 
 
Table X: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates -0.7306 0.0926 -7.889 3.66e-15 *** 
Moderate Donors -0.4776 0.2992 -1.596 0.11050 
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Table Y: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare between conservative non-donors and conservative donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -1.1015 0.0658 -16.740 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.6276 0.2104 -2.984 0.00286 ** 
 
 
Social Security Tables 
 
Table Z: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
Social Security. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 1.168 1.016 1.343 
Liberal donor 0.738 0.529 1.029 
Moderate 0.970 0.778 1.209 
Moderate donor 0.648 0.374 1.122 
Conservative 0.698 0.583 0.835 
Conservative donor 0.416 0.295 0.585 
 
 
Table AA: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) 0.15536 0.07116 2.183 0.0291 * 
Liberal donor -0.30402 0.16952 -1.793 0.0730 . 
Moderate -0.03071 0.11236 -0.273 0.7846 
Moderate donor -0.43425 0.28049 -1.548 0.1216 
Conservative -0.35934 0.09157 -3.924 8.82e-05 *** 
Conservative donor -0.87775 0.17416 -5.040 4.81e-07 *** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table AB: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal 0.15536 0.07116 2.183 0.0291 * 
Liberal Donors -0.30402 .16952 -1.793 0.0730 . 
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Table AC: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates 0.12465 0.08696 1.433 0.15181 
Moderate Donors -0.43425 0.28049 -1.548 0.12164 
 
 
Table AD: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security between conservative non-donors and conservative 
donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -0.20398 0.05764 -3.539 0.000405 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.87775 0.17416 -5.040 4.81e-07 *** 
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Earth’s biodiversity includes all extant species; however, species are not 
evenly distributed across the planet. Species tend to be clustered in densely 
populated areas known as “biodiversity hotspots;” species which inhabit only a 
single area are also termed “endemic,” and tend to be highly vulnerable to 
population-reducing changes in their environment. Biodiversity hotspots are 
considered priorities for conservation if the area has a high rate of endemism as 
well as a notable and continual habitat loss (Noss et al., 2015). Preventing 
biodiversity loss is a complex and multi-level decision-making process about 
setting priorities and defining clear biodiversity protection areas. Biodiversity 
loss, or the loss of entire species or sub-populations in an area, can be driven by 
multiple processes, including land use changes, climate change, and the 
introduction of invasive species (Plexida et al. 2018).  
The Mediterranean Basin is one such hotspot, transecting multiple 
countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, including European, Middle 
Eastern, and North African countries with different systems of government and 
cultural perceptions of environmental resources and biodiversity. Furthermore, the 
basin is one the most species-rich biodiversity hotspots on Earth in terms of 
endemic vascular plants and has high rates of endemism for amphibians and fish, 
as well as being an important migration corridor for many bird species (Cuttelod 
et al., 2008). The hotspot is at high risk for continued biodiversity loss due to 
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several human-driven factors including population increase and government-level 
environmental policies (Grainger, 2003).   
One method of preserving biodiversity hotspots is the legal designation of 
protected areas (PAs). PA territories are clearly defined geographic boundaries 
recognized by law or other official means to limit human uses of the land or 
marine space, enshrined for long-term conservation goals (International Union for 
Conservation, 2018). PAs are a commonly-employed policy to achieve 
conservation goals. However, different habitat types and biomes tend to have 
markedly different proportions of their total area set aside for conservation 
regardless of the recommendations outlined in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity treaty of 1992 (Watson et al., 2014). PA effectiveness for biodiversity 
protection also tends to vary based on a country’s domestic policies and where 
transnational biodiversity hotspots are managed by multiple countries (Clement, 
Moore, and Lockwood, 2016); establishing PAs is additionally complicated when 
species-rich regions across international borders and depend upon the decisions of 
multiple countries (Clement et al., 2016; Zimmer, Galt, and Buck 2004). As 
hotspot protection and biodiversity loss are issues that cross political borders, a 
domestic approach to preserving biodiversity through PAs may not be the most 
effective method of preventing habitat and species loss in hotspot zones.  
Previous studies demonstrate that macro-level social and economic factors 
affect domestic biodiversity protection. A study examining biodiversity changes 
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through forest loss found that both increasing per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) and population density had notable effects on decreased forest area in 
regions considered high-priority for biodiversity protection (Morales-Hidalgo, 
Oswalt and Somanathan, 2015). Therefore, both increasing economic growth and 
population holds a potentially negative correlation to a country’s terrestrial 
hotspot protection legislation. Furthermore, national democratic policies have 
irregular influence on environmental protection effectiveness. A broad literature 
and empirical analysis by Scruggs (2003) suggests that there is no correlation 
between democratic policies in a country and its environmental protection record. 
Other research, however, shows that democracy relates to the effectiveness of a 
country’s PAs only when considered in context with the country’s (in)equality, 
where greater total PA area tends to appear in democratic countries that also have 
low inequality (Kashwan, 2017). This research follows Boyce’s inequality 
hypothesis, which states that different forms of inequality tend to reduce 
environmental protection and enhance environmental degradation (Boyce, 1994).  
The purpose of this study was to examine the economic, demographic, and 
political characteristics of countries with the most effective domestic terrestrial 
PAs within the Mediterranean hotspot. Specifically, we examined the 
relationships between PA effectiveness in each country and GDP per capita, 
population density, and democracy and equality ratings. The effectiveness of PAs 
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in each country will be determined by what percent of the total hotspot area in 
each country was covered by terrestrial PAs.  
 
METHODS 
 For this project, we used geographic data from world borders with GDP 
and population data from 2010, world protected areas, world designated hotspots, 
and democracy and human development ratings in 2010 (Table 1). First, we 
identified countries with any portion of their territory covered by the 
Mediterranean Basin hotspot. Terrestrial PAs of the Mediterranean hotspot were 
separated from a worldwide data set of marine, terrestrial, and coastal PAs. We 
selected these target countries based on whether their territory crossed with the 
boundary of a raster of the hotspot area (cell size: 13000m
2
). A zonal statistics test 
returned each country’s hotspot coverage in square kilometers (km2).  We 
calculated the total area in km
2
 of the terrestrial PAs that covered the hotspot by 
country using zonal statistics. We then divided the area of the PAs in the hotspot 
by the total area of the country within the boundary of the designated hotspot. In 
order to have perspective on the completeness of our PA effectiveness percent, we 
also compared PA effectiveness by country to the total area of PAs covering  
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Table 1. Data Sources 
Name Who Created Time valid for Type Spatial Unit 
World Hotspots UN Environment 
Programme, 
World 
Conservation 
Monitoring 
Center 
2004 Shapefile Polygons 
World 
Designated 
Protected Areas 
UN Environment 
Programme, 
World 
Conservation 
Monitoring 
Center 
2017 Geodatabase Polygons 
Thematic 
Mapping World 
Borders 
Bjorn Sandvik, 
Thematic 
Mapping 
2009 Shapefile Polygons 
Democracy 
Index  
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
2010 Table Country  
Human 
Development 
Index 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
2010 Table 
 
Country 
 
km
2
. This allowed us to evaluate the percent of hotspot protected and the total 
area of protected hotspot per country.  
We compared the effectiveness value to main three variables: GDP per 
capita, population density in 2010, and a rating of countries based on democracy-
equality index (Table 2). For GDP per capita and population density per 
kilometer, we calculated the values from GDP in 2010, population in millions in 
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2010, and country area in km
2
 for target countries. For our third variable, the 
democracy and inequality index rating, we used the EIU “Democracy Index” and 
the UN Development Programme’s “Human Development Report” (Table 1). 
Creating a unique Equality Index, countries above the medians of democracy 
(6.215) and equality (.7465) were  
Table 2. Democracy-development index 
Country 
(ISO3) 
Democrac
y Index 
Human 
Developme
nt Index 
Equality Index  
(Ratings 
above/below 
medians of 
Democracy and 
Human 
Development 
Index) 
Country 
(ISO3) 
Democrac
y Index 
Human 
Developmen
t Index 
Equality 
Index   
ALB 5.86 0.454 Negative LBY 1.94 0.756 Negative 
DZA 3.44 0.724 Negative MLT 8.28 0.826 Positive 
BIH 5.32 0.711 Negative MCO no data no data Positive 
BGR 6.84 0.775 Positive MNE 6.27 0.792 Positive 
CPV 7.94 0.632 Negative MAR 3.79 0.612 Negative 
HRV 6.81 0.808 Positive PSE 5.44 0.669 Negative 
CYP 7.21 0.847 Positive PRT 8.02 0.818 Positive 
EGY 3.07 0.671 Negative SRB 6.33 0.757 Positive 
FRA 7.77 0.882 Positive SVN 7.69 0.876 Positive 
GRC 7.92 0.86 Positive ESP 8.16 0.867 Positive 
IQR 4 0.649 Negative SYR 2.18 0.646 Negative 
ISR 7.48 0.883 Positive MKD 6.16 0.735 Negative 
ITA 7.83 0.872 Positive TUN 2.79 0.714 Negative 
JOR 3.74 0.737 Negative TUR 5.73 0.737 Negative 
LBN  5.82 0.758 Negative     
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designated as positively democratic/equal, and those countries that falling below 
these two medians were designated negatively democratic with low equality 
(Table 3).  
With the values of each variable per country calculated in our target 
countries layer, we joined the tables containing the zonal statistics output of PA 
effectiveness and the three variables and saved the new data. From this layer, we 
developed three scatterplots–one for each variable of GDP per capita, population 
density and total PA area–in comparison to the effectiveness of the PA in each 
country. We also generated Tukey’s Five Number Summaries for PA 
effectiveness, total PA area, GDP per capita, and population density. To compare 
the efficiency of positively and negatively rated countries, we created a box-and-
whisker plot according to PA effectiveness to look for an average correlation 
Table 3. Results of Tukey’s Five Number Summaries of each variable calculated.  
Tukey’s 5 
Number 
Summary 
PA 
effectivene
ss (%) 
PA total 
(km2) in 
hotspot 
area 
GDP per 
capita 
Populations 
Density 
Positive 
Democracy
-Equality 
Index 
Rating 
Negative 
Democracy
-Equality 
Index 
Rating 
Min 0 0 2076 3.73 0 0 
Q1 0 0 4094 74.62 6.9 1.25 
Median 6.98 0.065 6631 92.48 24.5 6.4 
Q3 28.31 0.312 22878 119.25 31.57 9.8 
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Max 100.0 10.1 145,541 2846.15 100 41.192 
Upper 
outliers 
100.0 
 
1.287  
2.184  
2.44  
3.042  
8.892  
10.1  
145,541 1148.65  
2846.15  
68.48 22.62 
Lower 
outliers 
NA NA NA 3.73 NA NA 
 
between the positive and negative democracy/inequality indexes (Figure 1). We 
calculated average results without outliers. 
 
RESULTS 
Overall, PA effectiveness analysis showed that Greece, Macedonia, 
Croatia, Morocco, France, Slovenia, and Bulgaria had notably high effective 
hotspot protected areas within their territories being over 30% effective and 
falling above the third quartile (Figure 2). Countries to the south and east of the 
Mediterranean hotspot showed the lowest PA effectiveness, with Egypt, Libya, 
Monaco, Palestine, Western Sahara, and Serbia having no PA in their territory at 
all. PAs in Montenegro, Malta, and Iraq did not overlap with a hotspot area in 
these countries, and thus also had low PA effectiveness. There was a weak 
positive relationship between GDP per capita and PA effectiveness on a log scale 
(Figure 3). Countries above the third quartile for GDP per capita, often larger 
European countries (Figure 4), were above the median of PA effectiveness 
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(median PA effectiveness = 6.98% [Israel], Table 3), with the singular exception 
of Monaco, which has no PAs in its territory at all (Figure 4). Countries in the 
median GDP per capita ($6,631, Montenegro, Table 3) also fell mostly above the 
median PA effectiveness. Bulgaria, with a lower GDP per capita of $6,459, is a 
notable exception, as it holds the highest PA effectiveness with a GDP per capita 
below the median (Figure 2). 
Based on PA effectiveness, there appeared to be an “ideal” population 
density of 100 people per km
2
 (Figure 5). The countries with the highest PA 
effectiveness were clustered around 100 people per km
2
, and countries of higher 
and lower population density above and  
 
Figure 1. Comparison of positively rated and negatively rated countries on the 
democracy-equality index based on percent PA effectiveness.   
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Figure 2. PA effectiveness in countries of the Mediterranean Basin hotspot 
 
below this mark tended to have lower PA effectiveness the farther the population 
density was from 100 people per km
2
 (Figure 5). 
Positive and negative democracy/equality index ratings of the test 
countries are listed in Table 2. Ignoring PA effectiveness outliers for each group, 
the mean effectiveness of positive countries was calculated to be about 21%, 
while the effectiveness of negative countries was around 1.3%. The results of the 
average PA effectiveness according to the positive and negative indexes are 
compared with a box-plot (Figure 1). Geographically, the countries with high PA 
effectiveness and positive index rating were predominantly European countries on 
the northern border of the hotspot, and negative index countries largely 
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overlapped with low PA effectiveness -rated countries in the south and east of the 
hotspot (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 3. GDP per capita (in US $, 2010) compared to PA effectiveness by 
country in the Mediterranean Basin hotspot. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of countries by GDP per capita in the Mediterranean Basin 
hotspot. 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of population density (2010, people per m
2
) by PA 
effectiveness by country in the Mediterranean Basin hotspot. 
 
DISCUSSION  
64 
 
The data demonstrated a weakness in domestic biodiversity responsibility: 
nations of lesser economic standing and political equality tended to cover less of 
the Mediterranean Basin hotspot with PAs. Our study reported that countries with 
more developed economies—such as European countries and countries on the 
western border of the Mediterranean Basin hotspot—showed a high total area of 
PAs covering a hotspot, as well as scoring at least above the 75% percentile in PA 
effectiveness. We also found that high PA effectiveness was centered on what 
appeared to be an “ideal” population density for countries of 100 people per 
square meter. These results seem to contradict previous research, which states that 
increases in economic growth and population density tended to result in net loss 
in area of protected forests in high-priority protection areas by country (Morales-
Hidalgo et al., 2015). Therefore, our data potentially indicate a discrepancy 
between the designation of protected areas and actual protection of habitats: even 
as the area of PAs in a country increases, or at least remains higher than average 
at higher GDP levels, there is still potential damage occurring within those 
protected areas.  
Clement et al. (2016) provides a potential explanation for this discrepancy: 
in an examination of biodiversity protection in the Alps, cultural perception and 
support of biodiversity protection was the main determining factor of a PA 
successfully maintaining biodiversity and habitat. Therefore, total area of 
protection, GDP, or population density must be considered in tandem with the 
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motivation of management and the community supporting hotspots in the country 
overall. Our data supports the argument that democracy must be accompanied 
with high equality ratings. Previous research disagrees as to whether a democratic 
government structure alone indicated a country’s effectiveness in protecting 
environmental resources, with a recent study suggesting that democracy is only 
significant when a country is a democracy with high equality (Kashwan, 2017). 
Our study shows that a highly democratic and equal country provides more 
effective PA protection on average, with the exception of the outliers: Morocco 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Figure 6). The spatial 
distribution of more effective PA protection follows this trend (Figure 6). Our 
study thus demonstrates that a country’s environmental protection effectiveness 
has a notable relation to both governing style and equality of a country. 
However, evaluating countries based simply on total area (km
2
) of PAs 
covering a hotspot produced different results than the evaluation based on percent 
effectiveness. Based on total area, western and European countries feature 
prominently, with Morocco, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Greece as upper 
outliers in this category (Figure 7). While these countries had scores closer to the 
median in PA effectiveness (Figure 1), they are all above the third quartile in total 
domestic PA area (km
2
) covering hotspot area (Figure 7). Generally, there is a 
weak positive relationship between total PA area on a hotspot and PA 
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effectiveness (Figure 8). However, countries with extremely low total hotspot area 
also tended to fall into the higher  
Figure 6. Distribution of countries in the Mediterranean Basin hotspot by PA 
effectiveness (%) and democracy-equality index rating. 
 
percentiles of PA effectiveness (Figure 1). This discrepancy between highest 
effectiveness and highest total area of PAs of hotspot underscores incompleteness 
for domestic PA efficiency. Dividing by the total area of the hotspot in the 
country to create the percent effectiveness rating favored countries such as 
Bulgaria, which only had a small amount of hotspot in its territory and happened 
to be protecting that small area with 0.013 km
2
 of PAs, and disadvantaged larger 
countries that had more territory covered by the hotspot as well as a total of more 
km
2
 of domestic PAs. 
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The economic development of countries towards greater parity with their 
neighbors should assist transnational biodiversity protection in light of 
international standard and policy limitations. Whereas Watson et. al (2014) 
advocates for individual nations to double-down PA efforts, the inefficiency of 
domestic PAs for negative index countries suggests that international treaties and 
agreements cannot overcome regional or national differences in socioeconomic 
status. Zimmerer et al. (2004) noted the inefficacy of international institutions 
such as the United 
 
Figure 7. Total PA area (km
2
) by country in the Mediterranean Basin hotspot. 
 
 
Nations, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the 
World Wildlife Fund. These organizations launched new conservation initiatives 
through 1980-2000, resulting in a boom in global PA coverage. However, the 
effectiveness of these PAs were predominantly determined by national and even 
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regional differences in conservation priorities, such as development and 
management style. 
While international conservation institutions have low efficacy, economic-
development institutions potentially re-prioritize conservation policies for 
developed and developing countries alike (Watson et. al, 2014; Clement et. al, 
2016). The economic and social factors determined to influence domestic PA 
effectiveness are driven by international commerce and trade have been 
highlighted by other studies (Zimmerer et al. 2004). Thus, economic development 
institutions could improve both political and environmental agency and 
protections by enhancing popular financial security. If environmental activists 
have acknowledged the interconnectedness of the global environment, their 
solutions must take an international approach that considers economic and social 
inequality between nations a barrier to biodiversity protection that transcends state 
boundaries.   
A few data inconsistencies are worth noting for PA size. Our WDPA 
shapefile was created from hotspot data that was self-reported by each individual 
country, and manipulation of PA size by regimes with incentives for top-down 
manipulation of environmental protection is possible. A second source of error in 
relation to PA effectiveness is that our Mediterranean hotspot shapefile is dated to 
2004. It is possible that hotspot size has changed between 2004 and 2018. Finally, 
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GDP and population data also dated to 2010, which carries the same source of 
time-sensitive inaccuracy. 
Future research should test the relationships between democracy, equality, 
and environmental protection supported in this study through other means. A 
larger—if not global—sample can provide a more robust examination of the 
inequality hypothesis supported by this study. Also, Clement et al. (2016) 
identified that the culture surrounding PA management was a notable determinant 
of PAs’ successes in biodiversity protection. The positive relationship between 
democracy and high equality could be related to research conducted by Clement 
et al. 
 
 
Figure 8. PA total area (km
2
) compared to PA effectiveness in protected hotspot 
territory by country in the Mediterranean Basin hotspot. 
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(2016) who noted that cultural support increases PA effectiveness, which would 
support Boyce’s inequality and biodiversity protection hypothesis (1994). 
Alternatively, a grassroots analysis of PA management techniques could account 
for the discrepancy in our findings for higher GDP per capita countries and the 
established body of evidence on PA effectiveness and economic and population 
growth, as well as the macro-level factors determining cultural and management 
differences (Zimmerer et al., 2004). Therefore, future investigation should 
establish an index of public support for biodiversity conservation in comparison 
to scales of PA effectiveness and total PA area in a country to determine the 
influence of public opinion on biodiversity legislation and vice-versa.  
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The goal of this research was to address a serious mental health concern in 
Adams County in hopes of helping to find a community solution. Professor 
Nathalie Lebon and community health educator Yeimi Gagliardi dedicated 
considerable time and assistance with research and data collection.  
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            Healthy Adams County, a non-profit organization in Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania, conducts a community health assessment every three years, entitled 
the Community Health Needs Assessment of Adams County. In 2015, it revealed 
that depression is a major health concern among adults, and this was the impetus 
for my survey.  The focus of this research was narrowed to women of Latin 
American background, since research has shown that Latinos, especially Latina 
women, are more vulnerable to depression than other racial/ethnic groups 
(Cabassa, Lester, & Zayas 2007; Fox & Kim-Godwin 2011; Molina & Alcántara 
2013). Living in poverty, being uninsured, and having limited access to 
transportation have been cited as barrier to accessing mental health care, and these 
barriers are more pronounced for immigrant women and undocumented women 
(Marshall, Urrutia-Rojas, Mas, & Coggin 2005; Nadeem et al. 2007; Acury & 
Quandt 2007; Martinez-Tyson, Arriola, & Corvin 2016). Besides a lack of 
material resources that would expand access to healthcare, stigmatization of 
mental illness in some Latino communities also exists. Attitudes towards mental 
illness and its treatment may contribute to the underutilization of mental health 
services among Latino communities. Certain attitudes, such as viewing mental 
illness as a somatic problem, as opposed to a chemical imbalance in the brain, and 
not considering psychiatric help as a resource, may cause Hispanics to not look 
into mental health treatment (Cabassa et al. 2007).  
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            Wellspan Community Health Improvement, located in Gettysburg, offers 
an insurance-type program for people living in poverty, which addresses some of 
the hurdles Latina women face. This program makes important strides in 
addressing the issues many low-income people face regarding healthcare, such as 
living in poverty or being uninsured. However, the program does not have a 
bilingual health professional, which significantly limits the number of Spanish-
speaking women who can benefit from these services, particularly immigrant and 
undocumented Latina women. Wellspan Community Health and the Latino 
Services Task Force of Adams County (LSTF) are looking to widen the services 
available to the underserved Latino community in Adams County, and the 
information gathered from this survey will be used to better understand what 
obstacles the community faces in accessing mental health care.  
          It is important to note that, although I tried to access a wide range of 
women in the Gettysburg Community, I believe that most participants in this 
survey may be more aware of services for mental health issues than other migrant 
workers because they already have access to an existing network of people and 
programs. All of the surveys were collected at English as a second language 
classes, Sunday Swimming, and the Wellspan Community Health Improvement, 
places that a person goes when they already have established roots in the 
community. These roots give access to other women and immigrant and Latina 
families, who can help provide information and guidance to them, as well as 
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resources from the college and town that an individual outside of these programs 
would likely not be privy to. This likely shaped the results of my survey. 
          The barriers Latina women may face when accessing mental health care are 
numerous, partially due to their gender and ethnic minority status, and are 
compounded by class and migratory status. I found that, among this sample of 
Latina women, low wages, lack of insurance, limited transportation, and a lack of 
Spanish-speaking health professionals limit women’s access to mental health care. 
I believe some of these problems can be remedied, and I make recommendations 
for Wellspan and the Latino Services Task Force later in this paper.  
 
MENTAL HEALTH & LATINA WOMEN 
The Adams County Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) shows 
that depression affects adults of all ethnicities living in Adams County, but Latina 
women are the focus of this paper due to their increased vulnerability to 
depression and decreased access to resources. Women of all races face an 
increased risk to depression compared to men; one study showed that women in 
every age group are affected by depression almost twice as much as men (Pulgar 
et al. 2016). Hispanic men, and especially Hispanic women, are less likely than 
Whites to receive mental health care (Heilemann, Pieters, & Dornig, 2016; Fox & 
Kim-Godwin 2011). Research focusing on Mexican Americans has shown large 
cultural barriers that may contribute to low quality and limited access to mental 
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health care, such as low education levels, poverty, and discrimination (Valencia-
Garcia, Simoni, Alegría, & Takeuchi 2012). This is significant for Adams County, 
where the most common country of origin, outside of the U.S., is Mexico (Data 
USA). 
 Latinas, as both women and ethnic minorities, may live with few or fragile 
resources and face ethnic or immigrant related structural barriers, such as 
language or cultural differences, which affect access to health care (Valencia-
Garcia et al. 2012). Latinas are at greater risk for, and experience higher rates of, 
anxiety and depression (Valencia-Garcia et al. 2012). However, Latina women are 
often unable to receive proper care, despite evidence showing that they are in 
need of services to combat depressive symptoms. One study by Heilemann et al. 
(2016) examined over 9,000 adult Latina women and found that 68% of those 
who met the criteria for a past year major depressive episode went undiagnosed. 
There is no single reason why Latina women, including immigrant and 
undocumented Latinas, are not able to access high quality care, but the following 
sections will demonstrate the most significant barriers that affect Latina women’s 
access to these resources. 
Underutilization of Health Services:  
Research shows that Latinos in the U.S. underutilize healthcare services; 
this is true even when they have insurance and equal access to care (Nadeem et 
al., 2007, p. 1548; Hochhausen, Lee, & Perry 2011). However, equal access is not 
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the norm: for example, U.S.-born white women are much more likely to be in 
treatment for mental health issues than women from minority groups (Nadeem et 
al. 2007). One study found that only 8.8% of Mexican-Americans (mainly those 
born in the United States) utilized mental health services, and those born outside 
of the U.S. showed only a 4.6% rate of usage over a 12-month period (Vega, 
Kolody, Aguilar-Gaxiola, & Catalano 1999:932-33). Indeed, Hochhausen et al. 
(2011) reported in their research that, among women who felt a need for mental 
health services, 67% of white women compared to 50% of Latina women sought 
out those services (2011:15). Although this low-level of utilization may occur 
even for those with access to health insurance, there are instrumental barriers in 
place that influence why Latinas are not seeking or finding mental health care 
services, including lack of insurance, documentation status, and stigma, which 
will be discussed in the following sections. 
Health Insurance & Income 
Latina women often do not utilize services because they lack insurance or 
are unable to pay for mental health care. Marshall et al. (2005) argues that people 
with the worst health status are typically those that have the highest poverty rates 
and the least education (2005:918). In one study, researchers investigated Latino 
subgroups: Mexicans and Colombians, compared to other Latinos, were more 
likely to mention economic barriers as a reason people do not use programs for 
mental health. In the study, one Mexican woman said, “many people don’t use 
80 
 
those programs for mental help, maybe because they feel that are not going to 
have money to pay for psychological treatment’” (Martinez-Tyson, Arriola, & 
Corvin, 2016:1294).  
Of all racial and ethnic groups in the United States, Latinos are the least 
likely to be insured and the least likely to use health care services for preventative 
care (Valencia-Garcia et al. 2012). Alegría et al. (2007) found that only about 
19% of uninsured Latinos used any type of health service, even those with a 
psychiatric disorder; those who had insurance used services at 38.6%, for those 
with public insurance, and 51.6% for those with private insurance, which shows a 
significant difference between utilization of services for those with and without 
insurance (Alegría et al., 2007:81-82). Thus, one’s socioeconomic status is a 
major factor in who receives help for mental illness. 
In order to combat some of the difficulties that comes with living in 
poverty or being uninsured, Wellspan offers a health insurance-type program for 
those living below the federal poverty line. This program gives people a card that 
they can use for health services even if they do not have documentation; they 
bring the card to their doctor’s office, pay $10, and can access various healthcare 
services, including mental health. This program certainly helps eradicate major 
barriers to healthcare access for Latina women living in poverty and Latina 
women without legal documents. However, there are no Spanish-speaking mental 
health professionals at Wellspan, so even though economic and legal barriers have 
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been eliminated, most immigrant women will not be able to use this service for 
mental health purposes. Finally, according to Gagliardi (2018) about 209 Latina 
women over the age of 18 use this insurance program. The program expires every 
six months to one year and card holders have to reapply frequently (Gagliardi 
2018) . Yeimi Gagliardi, an employee of Wellspan Community Health 
Improvement, is unsure how many people know about this insurance, but she 
states that there are likely more than 209 women using the program; however, 
since they must reapply so frequently, their card might have lapsed and they 
would not be in the system as a card holder. 
Migratory Status and Language: 
One of the most significant factors that can affect a Latina woman’s access 
to mental health care is whether she was born in the U.S. Immigrant status has 
shown to decrease one’s access to health care (Marshall et al. 2005) and foreign 
born Latinas are less likely than U.S.-born Latinas to receive mental health care 
(Nadeem et al. 2007). Immigrant Latinos are often employed in jobs with low 
pay, and the money they do earn may be sent to family members in their home 
country (Hiott, Grzywacz, Arcury, & Quandt 2006). Latina immigrants, compared 
with U.S.-born Latinas, typically have fewer years of education, earn lower 
wages, and are more likely to be concentrated in agricultural, manufacturing, and 
service industries, which results in immigrant Latinas living in poverty in higher 
numbers than U.S.-born Latinas (Molina & Alcántara 2013). As previously 
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shown, being impoverished means one has less access to insurance, and thus to 
healthcare of any kind. 
The lack of bilingual mental health professionals presents a major 
difficulty for monolingual Latina women. Studies show that people living in the 
US who have limited English-language skills are less likely to seek and receive 
needed mental health services (Alegría et al. 2007). Additionally, not all Latino 
people speak Spanish; farmworkers, for instance, speak a variety of indigenous 
languages, such as Mixtexo, Tarasco, or Quiche; thus, Spanish is an unfamiliar 
language and mental health professionals fluent in Spanish would not be helpful 
(Satcher, 2001:141). Martinez-Tyson et al. (2016) noted that many Latinos, 
regardless of their English proficiency, still prefer to talk about and receive info 
about health issues in their native language (2016:1298). For mental health issues, 
the ability to communicate is critical, in order to give voice to the anxieties and 
stressors in one’s life. Without a someone who can speak her language, it would 
be impossible for a woman to communicate these things and get medication or 
receive counseling. 
Farmworkers in Adams County 
Adams County, with a population of about 100,000 people, is a relatively 
small county in the state of Pennsylvania. However, it is one of the counties with 
the highest number of migrant farmworkers. Seasonal farmworkers live in one 
location during the year, whereas migrant workers migrate from one place to 
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another to earn a living in agriculture (Hovey & Magaña 2000). Migrant 
farmworkers establish a temporary home, and their migration may be from farm 
to farm, within a state, between states, or internationally (Arcury & Quandt 
2007:346). 
Most of these farmworkers are Latino: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and 
others from South and Central America (with others from Jamaica and Haiti 
among other countries.) Ninety-five percent of migrant and seasonal farmworkers 
are foreign born. Each year, about 45,000 to 50,000 migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers are employed in Pennsylvania to harvest crops. Adams County has 
more migrant farmers compared to other counties with similar numbers of 
agricultural workers (Cason & Snyder 2004). Although men more commonly 
work in agriculture, about 25% of agricultural workers are women (Pulgar et al. 
2016: 498).  
 Farm workers are not high-wage earners. Although the median income in 
Adams County is about $60,000 per year, for the general population, (Data USA), 
about sixty-one percent of the state’s hired farmers live in poverty. Farm workers 
often live in rented houses, apartments, or condominiums. Others live with 
extended family members or in a one-family residence. In a study by Cason & 
Snyder (2004) that analyzed farmworkers in Adams and Chester counties, 45 
Hispanic people were involved in focus groups. The average number of people 
living in the same household was 5.3. 80 percent had eight years or less of 
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education, and about half had an income of $15,001-$25,000, which is below the 
federal poverty level. The study participants were less educated and had lower 
incomes than the general population of the two counties studied. In this study, the 
focus group participants mentioned several issues that affected a large number of 
them: diabetes, poor dental health, heart disease, being overweight, and 
female/teen depression. It is believed that some migrant women and teens were 
experiencing depression due to a lack of community interaction in their new 
communities. This was especially difficult since many came from small villages 
in Mexico where family and neighbors are part of an extended family network. 
Access to basic health services was noted as problematic by some participants 
(Cason & Snyder 2004). 
These researchers noted that service providers in the area found that many 
types of services are available, but access to these services was difficult for 
farmworkers. The main barriers they cited were language differences, lack of 
finances or insurance coverage, and lack of transportation. National data shows 
that almost 60 percent of Latino migrant farm workers have employers that pay 
for work injuries but no type of formal insurance. There are very low levels of 
insured migrant workers, based on this study: only 12 percent of farmworkers, 6 
percent of their spouses, and 13 percent of their children have some form of 
health insurance (Cason & Snyder 2004: 13). Workers’ children may be eligible 
for the Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which gives benefits to families 
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who cannot afford health insurance; but, many immigrants are not enrolled due to 
the belief that all immigrants are barred from publicly funded health care (Cason 
& Snyder 2004:13). Medicaid, on the other hand, is a form of public assistance 
for low-income families that is not available to undocumented people. Service 
workers also noted other barriers to care, such as literacy, which goes along with 
the limited education many agricultural workers have, in addition to fear of 
deportation for undocumented workers; the inability to take time off of work; and 
low service use by migrant Latino farm workers in general (2004:14).  
Stigmatization of Mental Illness 
Thus far, the focus of this paper has been on material barriers that keep 
Latina women from receiving mental health care, such as low wages or lack of 
insurance. However, cultural factors such as stigma against mental health and 
support for these issues are important factors that may prevent women from 
seeking needed help. Latina, black, and immigrant women are more likely to 
report concerns about stigma related to depression treatment, and some Latinos 
report that taking anti-depressants is a sign of severe depression, being “crazy” or 
illicit drug use (Interian et al. 2010). Interian, Martinez, Guarnaccia, Vega, & 
Escobar (2007) found that taking antidepressants was seen as a sign of severe 
illness. In this study, one participant, upon being told she needed anti-depressants, 
said, “‘¿Bueno, tan grande es mi problema?” (Well, so my problem is that big?)’” 
(Interian et al. 2007: 1591). Some women reported viewing anti-depressants as 
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something only “crazy people” need or for those unable to deal with life’s 
problems (Interian et al. 2007). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
As mentioned earlier, depression is a common and significant health issue 
in Adams County. I chose to conduct a survey which addressed what barriers exist 
for Latina women when accessing mental health care. I worked closely with 
Yeimi Gagliardi, an employee at WellSpan Community Health Improvement and 
the co-chair of the Latino Services Task Force (LSTF) of Adams County. I 
conducted this research in order to supply both Wellspan and the LSTF with 
information about the specific mental health concerns of the Latino community in 
Adams County. I attached my survey, in English and Spanish, as annex. 
I chose to work under a participatory action framework, which prioritizes 
working with community members to understand the needs of the community 
from their perspective. Working with members of the community the researcher is 
studying is a way of engaging with local knowledge. The researcher should 
engage with “insiders” as well as expert or other researchers in order to construct 
knowledge together (Naples & Gurr 2014). However, my framework is limited 
because I did not work directly with Latina women in the community. Instead, I 
worked with Yeimi Gagliardi, who served as an “insider” because she works 
closely with the Latino community and is bilingual: she provided local 
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knowledge. I also utilized Kimberlé Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality. I 
chose this framework because it allows for the examination of multiple identities 
and the interactions between them. This is particularly important for immigrant 
Latina women who may occupy multiple marginalize identities, as ethnic 
minorities, women, undocumented residents, and members of the working-class 
or working poor. To avoid monolithic understandings of these women and their 
various identities, it is important to understand how all of these identities affect 
their lived experiences and contribute to different advantages and disadvantages. 
Ultimately, my research was able to reveal the most significant challenges for the 
most vulnerable members of this community. 
The survey was administered in person and online. However, I did not 
receive any online responses from women. I used Survey Monkey to analyze my 
data. This site allowed me to analyze descriptive statistics, such as how many 
women answered each question and how they answered. Using upper-level 
statistics is preferable because it allows one to see how each factor influences 
another factor, but I do not have enough training in statistics to do this. Luckily, if 
the LSTF chooses to, they can export the data I have collected to a statistic 
program and hire another student to analyze the statistics more completely. In 
order to get in-person survey results, I distributed a 34-question pen and paper 
survey at various educational and recreational programs that are offered for 
people of Latin American descent in Adams County. Surveys were distributed at 
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English as a second language classes, offered twice a week at Gettysburg College, 
and Sunday swimming, a program that teaches children how to swim.  
Limitations 
 
 This research project had several limitations. Due to time constraints and a 
lengthy process to get certification from Institutional Review Board, I was unable 
to pre-test my survey. A pre-test would have identified any issues with the 
phrasing of certain questions. As a result, one question had to be eliminated, 
asking participants whether they were seasonal or migratory agricultural workers. 
I asked this question to identify differences between migrant farmworkers and 
farmworkers who live in the area year round. However, after collecting many 
surveys, a participant informed me that the question did not make sense to her and 
other women near her who were taking the survey. Thus, all survey responses to 
this question were discarded. 
 Like with any survey, a limitation is that participants can skip any 
question they want. the responses to questions they did answer were valuable, but 
the surveys were incomplete, and thus certain questions had more data to draw 
from than others. This may be due to the sensitive nature of the survey, which 
asked participants personal information which they may have felt uncomfortable 
answering, even though the survey was anonymous. 
 Finally, my identities as a white Gettysburg College student and a Native 
English speaker likely positioned me as an outsider. I was able to limit this 
89 
 
somewhat by speaking Spanish to these women (although I am not fluent) and by 
referencing my work with Wellspan and Yeimi Gagliardi, a place and person 
known to some of these women. Nonetheless, my position as outsider possibly 
limited what people were willing to share on the survey. 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Demographics 
 
52 women participated in this research survey. One response was omitted 
because the woman did not identify as Latina. No responses were collected 
online. 12 responses were collected from English as a Second Language classes; 
20 responses were collected from Sunday Swimming classes, and 20 responses 
were collected by Yeimi Gagliardi through her work at Wellspan. Countries of 
origin include: Mexico (34), Puerto Rico (4), Colombia (2), Guatemala (1) and 
the United States (5), for a total of 46 respondents. This supported data showing 
that Mexico is the most popular country of origin of foreign born people in 
Adams County (Data USA). 
Language Barriers 
Most of the participants identified their preferred language as Spanish. 46 
women chose Spanish as their preferred language and 4 women chose English; 
one chose both English and Spanish. This was not a surprise considering the 
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research showing that Spanish is the most commonly spoken language in Adams 
County, next to English (Data USA). Another question asked women to evaluate 
their level of English language skills, and the vast majority knew a little bit of 
English or none at all (see Annex 3, tables 2 and 19). 
A language barrier can present numerous consequences for women when 
accessing mental health care. A major issue is the lack of mental health providers 
who speak Spanish. This concern was brought up several times throughout the 
survey. For instance, question 16 asked women why they had stopped going to a 
doctor, if that was the case. One woman specifically cited a lack of providers that 
speak her language as a reason she stopped seeing a doctor (see Annex 3, table 
16). One question asked participants why they had not seen a trained mental 
health professional, if they had considered it. Six women identified a lack of 
providers that speak their native language as an issue (see Annex 3, table 22). 
This lack of Spanish-speaking mental health professionals has been 
identified by researchers. Data indicates that Latinos comprise a tiny percentage 
of practicing psychologists; for instance, in a survey of 596 psychologists with 
active practices, only 1% of the randomly selected group identified as Latino, 
whereas 96% identified as white (Satcher 2001:141). Another survey discovered 
that there are 29 Latino mental health professionals for every 100,000 Latinos in 
the U.S. population, whereas for whites, the rate was 173 for every 100,000 white 
people. However, these surveys were not looking at language skills specifically, 
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only ethnicity, and being Latino does not mean one is fluent in Spanish. There is 
no guarantee all 29 of these professionals can speak Spanish, so the situation for 
immigrants appears even bleaker in terms of language barriers.  
Furthermore, Wellspan offers an inexpensive insurance-type program for 
people in the area, as previously noted. This program includes services for mental 
health. However, there is no Spanish speaking therapist, and thus most 
participants in this survey would not be able to attend any sessions or receive as 
much help as they could if they were able to speak in their native language. 
 Additionally, when respondents were asked their language preference, an 
“other” option was included. This was to take into account Latino women who 
speak a non-Spanish/English language, such as an indigenous language. As 
mentioned earlier, research shows that some farmworkers from parts of Mexico 
may speak several different indigenous languages (Satcher, 2001:141). However, 
it was unsurprising that no participants spoke these languages. First of all, the 
survey itself was in Spanish, so they would not have been able to answer the 
question if they did not understand Spanish. Also, the Latino community 
members who go to programs such as ESL classes and Sunday Swimming are 
generally a Spanish-speaking group, and those who do not speak Spanish would 
probably find it hard to communicate with other people going to these programs, 
or even find information about their existence. 
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Discrimination may also come up for monolingual Latina women. I 
crosstabulated question 20, which asked if participants had felt discriminated 
against while in the United States, with question 19, asking about participants 
level of English language skills (see Annex 3, table A). Of the women who had 
felt discriminated against, six cannot speak English and two can. Meanwhile, for 
those who had not felt discriminated against, three cannot speak English, and four 
women can. Thus, more women who cannot speak English have experienced 
discrimination than women who can speak English. Thus, there was a connection 
between the inability to speak English and feelings of discrimination, as well as 
the ability to speak English and not experiencing discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transportation 
Question 20: 
Have you felt 
discriminated 
against? 
Q: 19 
I don’t 
know 
English 
(in %) 
I know a 
little bit of 
English 
(in %) 
I know 
English 
very 
well 
(in %) 
I know 
enough 
to get 
around 
(in %) 
Skip 
this 
question 
(in %) 
Total  
Yes 31.6 
 
57.9 
 
10.5 
 
0.00 
 
12.5 n = 19 
No 15.7 
 
57.8 
 
21.0 
 
5.2 
 
0.0 n = 19 
Unsure 37.5 
 
37.5 
 
25.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 n = 18 
Total # 
respondents 
n = 12 n = 25 n = 8 n = 1 n = 0 n = 46 
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Lack of transportation has been noted as a barrier to accessing health care 
(Martinez-Tyson et al., 2016), especially among those with a low socioeconomic 
status (Syed, Gerber, & Sharp, 2013). However, even when controlling for 
socioeconomic status, whites had higher rates of transportation use for health care 
access than ethnic minorities (2013:989). Further, Syed et al. (2016) noted that 
people in rural areas, compared with urban ones, face more barriers to 
transportation access. Rural patients had a higher burden of travel for health care 
when measured by distance and time (2016:987). When looking at a large 
secondary analysis of data, Syed et al. (2016) noted that “3.6 million people do 
not obtain medical care due to transportation barriers [in the United States]. These 
individuals were more likely to be older, poorer, less educated, female, and from 
an ethnic minority group” (2016:987).  
 As Table 11 shows, participants were asked if they have access to a car. 
Participants were also asked if it is difficult to receive services due to a lack of 
transportation (see table 12).  Interestingly, the majority of women (37) say they 
always have access to a car; yet, 19 women say they sometimes or always 
experience difficulty accessing services due to lack of transportation. In order to 
understand this seeming contradiction, I cross-tabulated questions 13 and 14. As 
Table B shows below, of the women who said they always have access to a 
vehicle, two women said it is still difficult to access services and seven said it is 
sometimes difficult to access services. Thus, about a quarter of women who 
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always have access to a vehicle still have at least some trouble accessing services. 
However, it is clear that having access to a vehicle at least sometimes makes 
accessing services easier for women; 24 of the 37 women who always have access 
to a car (64.9%), responded that it was rarely difficult to access services because 
of a lack of transportation. Transportation issues were identified again in question 
15 when three women identified a lack of transportation as a reason they cannot  
get to a doctor (see Table 13). 
 
 
Employment, Income, & Family 
Most of the participants work outside of the home parttime or fulltime (see 
Annex 3, Tables 3 and 4). I was careful to write the option as working outside of 
the home, because the vast majority of these women have children, and thus are 
always working, even if not in a formal, paid setting. However, although most of 
Question 11: Do 
you have access to 
a vehicle? 
Q12: 
Yes 
(in %) 
 
Sometimes 
(in %) 
 
No/rarely 
(in %) 
Skip 
this 
question 
Total 
Yes, always 6.1 21.2 72.7 0.0 n = 33 
Sometimes 37.5 50.0 0.0 12.5 n = 8 
Never 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 1 
Total respondents n = 6 n = 11 n = 24 n = 1 n = 42 
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these women are earning incomes outside of the home, they are not necessarily 
earning enough to get by. The majority of women make $35,000 and less 
annually, and a significant amount (11 women out of 41 respondents) make less 
than $20,000 yearly (see Table 25). The federal poverty level for a family of four 
is $24,600. 
 Overwhelmingly, these participants are mothers, and the majority (32 of 
49 respondents) have two or three children, although a significant number have 
four or more children. To understand these women’s economic situations better, I 
looked at how many children each women has and tabulated these responses with 
their annual income (see Annex 3, Table C). The federal poverty limit depends on 
the size of a family; for a family of four the poverty limit is 24,600; for a family 
of six, it is $32,960. Based on the results, all women making below $20,000 per 
year are living below the federal poverty limit. But for many others, depending on 
their exact income, they are earning at or just above the federal poverty limit. 
Very few of these women and their families have much extra money to spare, 
particularly for out-of-pocket healthcare costs if they have limited or no 
insurance. 
Analyzing income is important when looking at mental health care 
because without insurance or the ability to pay for health care out-of-pocket, 
accessing care for mental health issues is nearly impossible. Earning a larger 
salary grants one greater access to quality healthcare (Marshall et al., 2005). 
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Marshall et al. (2005) further suggests poverty/low-income may make someone 
prone to needing healthcare more, either due to unsafe living conditions or lack of 
preventative care leading to greater health costs (both financially and physically) 
in the future. Poverty has consequences for quality of life that reach beyond a 
mere lack of material things; for instance, the poor are more likely than others to 
be exposed to stressful life events like unemployment and illness, and they live 
with long-term strains such as economic hardship and job dissatisfaction (Amato 
& Zuo 1992). These types of stressors may lead to mental health issues. 
 
 
 
Health Insurance & Income 
Question 12 asked participants if they have health insurance, and the 
results showed that many respondents do have health insurance (36) but a sizeable 
Question 10: 
 
Do you have 
health 
insurance? 
 
Q25: 
Less than 
$20,000 
(in %) 
$20,000-
35,000 
(in %) 
$35,000-
50,000 
(in %) 
$50,000-
100,000 
(in %) 
$100,000+ Skip this 
question 
Total 
Yes 21.7 26.1 21.7 30.4 0.0 0 n = 
23 
No 42.9 28.6 14.3 0.0 0.0 2 n = 
14 
Total # 
respondents 
n = 11 n = 10 n = 7 n = 7 n = 0 n = 2 n = 
37 
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portion (16) do not (see Annex 3, Table 10). This is significant because without 
insurance, the ability to pay for healthcare can be extremely difficult. In the 
United States, Latinos are the least likely to be insured (Valencia-Garcia et al., 
2012). When a person is uninsured, they are probably not going to use needed 
health services because they cannot pay for them. Many people get their health 
insurance from their employers; nationally, 49% of people get health insurance 
from their employer and 19% from Medicaid (health insurance for those living in 
poverty); in Pennsylvania, 53% get health insurance from their employer and 19% 
from Medicaid (Health Insurance Coverage). Thus, those without health insurance 
who are not receiving Medicaid (a government program that is not applicable to 
undocumented immigrants) and are not getting insurance from their employer 
probably do not have a high paying job that would allow them to pay for coverage 
out-of-pocket.  
 In order to understand the relationship between the uninsured women and 
their annual income, I crosstabulated these responses (see Annex 3, table C). I 
found that of the women who do not have health insurance, six of them make less 
than $20,000 per year. Thus, half the number of women (11) making less than 
$20,000 per year are also uninsured. Four other women who are uninsured only 
make $20,000-$35,000 annually. This suggests that there is a link between living 
in poverty and being uninsured. Alegría et al. (2007) found that only about 19% 
of  uninsured Latina women used any type of health service, even those with a 
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psychiatric disorder. Thus, a lack of health coverage is a significant obstacle to 
receiving care. 
 However, upon completion of my research, I learned that the insurance 
program Wellspan offers is sometimes mistaken as actual insurance by some 
users. This program allows people making below the federal poverty line to 
access limited health services, such as doctor’s visits, at a low cost. However, it is 
not a replacement for insurance even if it does help women living in poverty 
access some needed services. Thus, it is possible that some participants who said 
that they have insurance could be referring to this program, so it is possible the 
number of insured women in this survey has been overestimated.  
Immigrant Status 
The majority of women in this research are immigrants. As stated earlier, 
only five participants listed the United States as their country of origin. To 
understand how income and immigrant status intersect, I cross-tabulated annual 
income with migratory status (see Table D). Surprisingly, those earning annual 
salaries in the highest income bracket are all foreign-born women. However, since 
this survey did not ask participants to specify when they immigrated, some of 
these participants could have immigrated here at very young ages. However, this 
survey also showed that women earning the lowest incomes were all foreign-born 
as well. This inconsistency is perhaps due to the low number of U.S.-born Latina 
women who participated in this survey. Thus, my results could not confirm a 
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strong relationship between immigrant status and low wages. However, there is a 
stronger relationship between income and documentation status, which will be 
discussed in the next section. Finally, I cross-tabulated immigrant status and 
insurance status. Of the 13 women who say they do not have health insurance, all 
were foreign-born except one woman who was born in Gettysburg. Thus, the 
overwhelming majority of women who do not have health insurance are 
immigrants, whereas the majority of women who are U.S. born do have health 
insurance. 
Family separation issues due to immigration were not addressed much in 
this research, but the theme came up among immigrant women nonetheless. For 
instance, question 21 asked participants what things had caused them to be 
anxious or sad. The majority of women who answered chose “family problems” 
as one issue. This could mean a host of things not exclusive to family separation, 
but it does involve family. However, seven women chose “other” as an option, 
and two women wrote in “family distance” or “I miss my family” as a 
psychological stressor. This confirms considerable research, as previously stated, 
that shows that family distance can cause psychological distress. Studies show 
that immigrants in the U.S. tend to have declining mental health outcomes with 
more time spent in the U.S. (Torres, Lee, González, Garcia, & Haan 2016). And, 
the 2008 Pew Hispanic Survey shows that over 40% of immigrant Latinos living 
in the U.S. make at least weekly phone calls to family in their home countries 
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(Torres et al. 2016), showing that contact with family is important. Overall, 
Torres et al. (2016) found that cross-border ties are associated with greater odds 
of depression (2016:116). 
 
 
 
 
Undocumented Women 
Participants were asked about migratory status, and, to my surprise, 17 
women, (40% of participants) are U.S. citizens. In addition, ten women are 
permanent residents, five women are undocumented, one is a tourist, and four 
Q26: 
Migratory 
status 
Annual 
income: 
Less than 
$20,000 
(in %) 
$20,000-
35,000 
(in %) 
$35,000-
50,000 
(in %) 
$50,000-
$100,000 
(in %) 
$100,000+ Total 
U.S. citizen 11.8 29.4 23.5 35.3 0.0 n = 17 
Permanent 
Resident 
37.5 25.0 25.0 12.5 0.0 n = 8 
Undocumente
d 
60.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 n = 5 
 
Tourist 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 1 
Other 
 
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0  n = 1 
Total # 
respondents 
n = 8 n = 10 n = 7 n = 7 n = 0 n = 32 
101 
 
identified as “other,” for a total of 37 respondents. I believe the low number of 
respondents speaks to the small sample size of this research and the sensitive 
nature of this question. Although the survey is anonymous, the current political 
status is turbulent and there is increased stigma and discrimination against Latino 
immigrants (Neel 2017).  
I completed several crosstabulations, as shown in Tables E, F, and G (see 
Annex 3) to understand how migratory status, specifically being undocumented, 
intersects with having health insurance, education levels., and English language 
proficiency. It is important to note that it is difficult to make generalizations with 
this data given the small number of women who reported being undocumented. 
The details are summarized in the tables, but ultimately I found the following: 
U.S. citizens and permanent residents are more likely to have health insurance 
than undocumented women; most U.S. citizens have more than 12 years of 
education, while 3 of the 5 undocumented women only had 6-8 years; and, finally, 
no undocumented woman knows English fluently, while almost half of U.S. 
citizens know English very well. This supports research on undocumented 
women, as previously stated. For instance, Marshall et al. (2005) found that less 
than 5% of undocumented women, in one survey, spoke English.  
Fear of deportation is also a stressor that affects undocumented women. 
Molina & Alcántara (2013) found that in their study, 28% of Latina immigrants 
reported fears of being questioned about their legal status (2013:153). Fears of 
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being questioned about legal status may prevent undocumented immigrants from 
going to health care clinics out of fear that they will be reported to the authorities 
(Arcury & Quandt 2007; Martinez-Tyson et al. 2016; Marshall et al. 2005). These 
fears were addressed, in indirect ways, in this research. For instance, question 18 
asked women why they had stopped going to the doctor at any point. One 
undocumented woman listed her legal status as a reason. Question 21 asked 
participants reasons why they had ever felt sad or anxious, and four 
undocumented women listed their legal status. This shows that a lack of 
documents may cause women to avoid the doctor and to feel increased 
psychological stress. 
 
Q26: Migratory 
status 
Yes 
(in %) 
No 
(in %) 
Total 
 
U.S. Citizen 81.25 18.75 n = 16 
Permanent resident 88.9 11.1 n = 9 
Undocumented 40.0 60.0 n = 5 
Tourist 
 
0.0 100.0 n = 1 
Other 25.0 75.0 n = 4 
Total # respondents n = 24 n = 11 n = 35 
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Q26: 
Migratory 
Status 
Q29:: 
Less than 
1 
(in %) 
1-5 6-8 9-12 More than 
12 
Total 
U.S. Citizen 0.0 0.0 6.3 25.0 68.6 n = 16 
Permanent 
Resident 
11.1 0.0 44.4 44.4 0.0 n = 9 
Undocumented 0.0 0.0 60.0 20.0 20.0 n = 5 
Tourist 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 n = 1 
Other 0.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 25.0 n = 4 
 
Total # 
respondents 
n = 1 n = 0 n = 10 n = 11 n = 13 n = 35 
Q26: 
Migratory 
Status: 
Q22: 
I don’t 
know 
any 
English 
(in %) 
A little 
bit of 
English 
I know 
English 
very 
well 
Enough 
to get by 
I don’t 
want to 
answer 
this 
question 
Total 
U.S. Citizen 13.3 33.3 46.7 6.7 0.0 n = 
15 
Permanent 
Resident 
22.2 77.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 9 
Undocumented 20.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 5 
Tourist 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 1 
Other 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 n  = 1 
I don’t want to 
answer this 
question 
40.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 4 
Total # 
respondents 
n = 7 n = 18 n = 8 n = 1 n = 0 n = 
35 
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Agricultural Workers 
Questions 8 and 9 asked each participant if she or her partner works in 
agriculture (see Annex 3, table 8 and 9). Ten women said they work in agriculture 
and 13 women said their partners work in agriculture. It was surprising to see that 
almost as many women as men work in agriculture, given research that shows 
only about 25% of agricultural workers are women (Pulgar et al. 2016). Based on 
the research that shows that a significant number of agricultural workers are 
undocumented, I crosstabulated question 9, asking about a partner’s agricultural 
work, with migratory status (see Annex 3, table H). One U.S. citizen, four 
permanent residents, and two undocumented women have partners who work in 
agriculture. Thus, most agricultural workers in this study are not undocumented. 
However, this may be partially due to the small sample size and the small number 
of women who reported themselves as undocumented, as well as the location of 
where these surveys were collected. Surveys were collected in public spaces 
among a network of people who are already connected; undocumented people 
may be less likely to attend these programs since they may have fewer established 
networks and may fear interacting with people they do not know because of their 
legal status (Molina & Alcántara 2013) (Martinez-Tyson et al. 2016) (Valencia-
Garcia et al. 2012). 
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I also cross-tabulated yearly income with agricultural workers. Of the 
eight women who identify as agricultural workers and reported their yearly 
income, four make below $20,000/year, and one makes $20,000-$35,000 per year. 
This confirms the research that shows agricultural workers make low wages; 
however, three of the other women make above $35,000 per year, so not all wages 
are as low as others. Finally, I cross-tabulated health insurance and agricultural 
worker status. I found that eight of the ten women who identify as farmworkers 
have health insurance, and one does not. This contrasts with research showing that 
many agricultural workers do not have health insurance (Arcury & Quandt 2007). 
Studies have shown that farmworkers often meet criteria for depression 
and anxiety (Arcury & Quandt 2007; Pulgar et al. 2016). In order to discern 
whether agricultural workers showed any signs of psychological distress, I cross-
tabulated agricultural workers with question 17, which asked if participants have 
felt isolated from the rest of the Adams County Community (see Table I). Five 
female agricultural workers and seven non-agricultural workers responded that 
they sometimes feel isolated from the community. Studies also show that women 
in farm-working families, even those who are not themselves farmworkers, are 
vulnerable to depression due to stressful life conditions like poverty, food 
insecurity, limited education, and substandard housing (Pulgar et al. 2016). I also 
cross-tabulated agricultural workers with question 18, which asked participants to 
identify reasons they have felt anxious or sad (see Table J). One female 
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agricultural worker identified family problems as a stressor; two women identified 
their documentation status; four women identified a lack of money; and four 
women chose “other.” Of these four women, one wrote that a stressor is the 
mistreatment “we” receive, one wrote family distance, and one wrote problems at 
work. This shows that stressors for agricultural workers include work problems, 
documentation, and income. Hovey & Magaña (2000) describe how these 
characteristics contribute to psychological distress: 
It is important to note that the high overall rate of anxiety and depression 
found in the present sample does not imply that all immigrant 
farmworkers, per se, are highly anxious and/or depressed, but that the 
experiences that go into being an immigrant farmworker (e.g., 
discrimination, language inadequacy, reduced self-esteem, financial 
stressors, lack of family and social support) potentially influence 
psychological status. (128) 
 
 
Q26: 
Migratory status: 
Q10: 
Yes (in %) 
No I don’t want to 
answer this 
question 
Total 
U.S. Citizen 6.7 86.7 6.7 n = 15 
Permanent Resident 57.1 42.9 0.0 n = 7 
Undocumented 50.0 50.0 0.0 n = 4 
Tourist 100.0 0.0 0.0 n = 1 
Other 0.0 100.0 0.0 n = 3 
Total # respondents 
 
n = 8 n = 21 n = 1 n = 30 
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Q18: 
Reasons you have 
felt anxious/sad 
Q20: 
Yes 
(in %) 
No 
 
I don’t wish to 
answer this 
question 
 
Total 
Lack of money 0.0 80.0 20.0 n  = 5 
Family problems 10.0 80.0 10.0 n = 10 
Feelings that I 
don’t belong 
0.0 0.0 0.0 n = 0 
The state of my 
documentation 
28.6 71.4 0.0 n = 7 
I don’t wish to 
answer this 
question 
20.0 80.0 0.0 n = 5 
Total # respondents n = 4 n = 20 n  = 1 n = 27 
 
Q17: 
Have you felt 
isolated from the 
Adams County 
community? 
Q20: 
Yes 
(in %) 
No I don’t wish to 
answer this 
question 
Total 
No 13.3 83.3 3.3 n = 30 
Sometimes 41.7 588.3 0.0 n = 12 
Yes, Frequently 0.0 100.0 0.0 n = 2 
Total # respondents n = 9 n = 34 n = 1 n = 44 
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Underutilization of Services: Stigma Related? 
 As previously stated, research has noted that Latinos in the United States 
underutilize health services (Cabassa et al. 2007) (Vega et al. 1999) (Martinez-
Tyson et al. 2016). To address this question of health service utilization, various 
questions were posed. Participants were asked if they have a family doctor—37 
women do and 13 do not. They were also asked if they had considered talking to a 
mental health professional, and as previously stated, 15 women had considered it 
and 34 women had not. Since the subject of this research was not specifically 
about the underutilization of health services, the number of questions pertaining to 
this were limited. However, these two questions give an idea of whether services 
are being utilized. Most women have a family doctor, but about a quarter of 
women do not, a significant amount especially given the small sample size.  
Generally, the consensus by researchers is that Latinos receive and have 
less access to mental health care than White Americans (Heilemann et al. 2016; 
Hochhausen et al. 2011; Nadeem et al. 2007). This difference is not a 
coincidence, but often the result of factors already described in this paper 
(Cabassa et al. 2007).  For instance, about a quarter of participants had considered 
seeing a trained mental health professional; this survey did not ask women 
whether they have ever seen a trained therapist before, but given the instrumental 
barriers in place, it is likely that many women are unable to afford or find a 
Spanish-speaking therapist. However, besides structural barriers, the 
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stigmatization of mental health issues may also cause Latina women to avoid 
addressing mental health issues. 
Stigma is a powerful feeling that, researchers suggest, may keep people 
from seeking out help for problems with their mental health. Being labeled as 
depressed may signify to others stereotypes such as personal weakness (Interian et 
al. 2010:373) or weakness of character, which can cause feelings of shame for a 
woman who is seeking help (Martinez-Tyson et al. 2016:1290). Stigma is a 
feeling that is reported more frequently by immigrant and ethnic minority groups 
than white and U.S.-born women. Nadeem et al. (2007) found that, in a group of 
racially diverse women, immigrant Latina women were 26% more likely than 
U.S.-born white women to report stigma-related concerns (Nadeem et al. 
2007:1551). 
Stigma against mental health and its treatment may even cause a person to 
feel they do not need help. In a study of low-income women who met the criteria 
for depression, those who had stigma-related concerns about getting treatment for 
mental health issues were less likely to believe that they had a need for mental 
health treatment. Stigma included being embarrassed to talk about personal 
matters with another person, being afraid of what others might think, and fears 
that family members would not approve of them getting care (Heilemann et al. 
2016:1351-52). However, Latinas do not always endorse higher levels of stigma; 
a study by Nadeem et al. (2007) found that depressed white women reported more 
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stigma concerns than Latina women or women of color. Nadeem et al., (2007) 
noted that other barriers likely impede these women from getting care, such as a 
lack of insurance, and that if these barriers were removed, stigma would play a 
greater role among ethnic minority women (Nadeem et al. 2007:1551-1552). 
Thus, stigma may be less likely to play a role for some women when the 
possibility of treatment is not even available due to other barriers.  
 Clearly, feelings of stigma may cause women to avoid going to a 
professional or even recognizing symptoms of a mental health issue. Thus, in 
order to understand what is stopping women from receiving mental health care, 
stigma needed to be addressed. However, stigma is difficult to measure, and it 
may be a term not everyone is familiar with, especially those with less formal 
education. As a result, I tried to ask about stigma not by using the word, but by 
including answers, such as being uncomfortable, that addresses that feeling 
without stating it explicitly. 
Question 17 which asked participants if they have ever stopped going to a 
doctor. The possible responses were a) I did not like the doctor b) I do not have 
money to pay c) my legal documentation d) I felt uncomfortable (this included an 
option to explain why she felt uncomfortable). This last response did not 
specifically ask about stigma, but the hope was the respondents would elaborate 
on feelings of discomfort. Forty-eight women answered question 17; 19 women 
said they have stopped going to the doctor at some point. However, only 12 
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women responded to the following question, explaining why they had stopped 
going to the doctor, with the option to choose multiple reasons. More than half of 
the respondents (7 women) said they did not have money to pay, two said their 
legal status stopped them, and three said they felt uncomfortable. When asked to 
explain their feeling of being uncomfortable, one woman wrote that she does not 
have insurance, one said she does not speak English, and one wrote that she does 
not have money to pay and is undocumented. Clearly, these structural barriers 
prevent women from seeing a doctor, because those who cannot pay and do not 
have insurance simply stop seeing a doctor. However, no one wrote in an answer 
that indicated that they felt stigmatized or perceived mental illness as a sign of 
someone’s “craziness.” However, feelings of stigma are difficult to assess and I 
do not believe the measures in this survey were enough to ascertain whether 
women felt stigmatized or themselves stigmatize mental health issues.   
Health Literacy 
Health literacy is “the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic 
health information and services” (Coffman, 2010:116). Because the capacity to 
read and understand information is vital, health literacy may be limited by 
language barriers and a lack of formal education. Coffman (2010) has found a 
relationship between low health literacy and inadequate preventive health care use 
and poor health outcomes, as well as a relationship between low health literacy 
and depressive symptoms (2010:117). If one cannot navigate the health services 
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available to them, it may be difficult to access needed services, or know that they 
are available to you. For instance, there is a perception among immigrants, 
particularly those without documentation, that publicly funded healthcare is 
banned for all immigrants. This is untrue, but it might cause an immigrant not to 
look into healthcare resources at all (Cason & Snyder 2004).  
However, low health literacy is not a personal deficiency. Immigrants in 
the United States, for instance, did not grow up within the U.S. health care 
system, one that is already complicated for natives. Thus, it is not surprising that 
their familiarity and background with the health services will be limited, and 
further strained by language differences. This may mean a person is unable to 
function in the health care environment. She may have trouble identifying 
depressive symptoms, and thus not report them; she may be unaware of treatment 
options and unable to access health care services and navigate the complicated 
U.S. healthcare system (Coffman 2010). Martinez-Tyson et al. (2016) who 
researched perceptions of depression and access to mental health care among 
Latino immigrants, found in her study that one of the major factors that keeps a 
person from accessing mental health care is that she does not “accept, recognize, 
or think” she needs help. This research did not directly address health literacy in 
the survey; however, due to the number of foreign born women, and women with 
lower levels of formal education, it is possible that some participants’ health 
literacy is limited, which is a barrier to accessing care. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Latina women in Adams County are a subset of the large Latina 
population in the United States, and the participants in this survey present 
similarities and differences with the issues they face when accessing mental 
health services. Research shows that foreign-born Latina women typically earn 
lower incomes than U.S. born Latina women, but this survey did not strongly 
support that evidence; however, this could be due to the low number of U.S. born 
respondents. Further, our results found that about a third of respondents have no 
insurance, and the majority of women without insurance are foreign-born women, 
while the majority of U.S. born women are insured.  Respondents who have 
limited access to a vehicle identified transportation as a barrier to accessing 
services, given the fact that Adams County is located in a rural part of the state. 
Finally, we found that the majority of participants speak a little bit of English or 
none at all. Several women also identified a lack of Spanish-speaking health 
professionals as an issue when accessing health services.  
When addressing barriers to accessing mental health services, the most 
important findings from this research are a lack of Spanish-speaking health 
providers, limited transportation, and low wages and insurance rates that make 
paying for care impossible. The program Wellspan offers that provides 
inexpensive health services for women living in poverty is a step in the right 
direction. However, this program is not as useful for mental health services for 
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Latina women since there is no bilingual mental health professional. Therefore, 
Wellspan must find a Spanish-speaking mental health professional or translator, 
advertise their program widely, particularly to undocumented women and women 
experiencing poverty, advertise their location, and help with transportation as 
much as possible.  
Recommendations 
 
The Latino Services Task Force of Adams County and Wellspan 
Community Health hope to use this research to initiate a campaign to target 
Latino folks with depression. After completing this research project, I have 
several recommendations for these organizations. 
 First, it is important that immigrant and undocumented women know what 
healthcare options are available for them. This is especially important for 
undocumented women, who may have fewer options based on their citizenship 
status. Any campaign that informs people where they can access healthcare 
services should include information about where undocumented women can go 
for services. Wellspan should widely advertise their pseudo health insurance 
insurance program to people living below the federal poverty limit. 
 Additionally, participants expressed that they are not always sure where to 
go for health services. A campaign should make clear where health services are 
located, the hours they are open, and how to get there. In conjunction with this, 
because transportation is limited, some type of transportation service is 
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recommended for those people without consistent access to a vehicle. This could 
be in the form of organized carpools or finding a volunteer driver. Alternatively, 
Wellspan could have an information booth at a location where buses routinely 
stop; or, a driver could pick up clients from this central location. A final 
possibility would be to create an app that would allow folks to connect with 
Wellspan, express their needs, learn what resources are available to them, and 
perhaps could help people arrange carpools to the Wellspan office. This app 
would need to be in Spanish as well as English.  
 Farmworkers made up about one-sixth of the total participants in this 
research (9 women out of 52 respondents). Given the small size of this research, 
we were still able to survey a sizable population of migrant workers, but there is 
more work needed to be done to reach out to these folks. Because this population 
may be undocumented and monolingual, it is important for the LSTF and 
Wellspan to reach out to this community, perhaps by going to migrant worker 
housing or the LIU Migrant Education program in Gettysburg. These agricultural 
workers may be purposefully staying hidden to avoid being questioned about their 
legal status.  
 Finally, a major concern for women in this research is the lack of Spanish-
language health providers. It is imperative that these organizations look for health 
professionals or translators who can speak Spanish, and thus make patients feel 
safer and more comfortable in a healthcare setting. Language is an essential part 
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of treatment because if there is no communication between a professional and a 
patient, there can be no advice given and no thoughts exchanged, and healing 
cannot begin. Bilingual health professionals/translators would also help address 
the lack of health literacy among some of these women. This is particularly 
important because, since there is a health program ready for low-income women 
to use, the largest remaining barrier is finding a professional who can 
communicate with these women now that they can afford such a service. 
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Annex 1 
 
1.) Do you have a Family Doctor?  
 
□ No  
□ Yes  
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
2.) My language preference is: 
 
□ Spanish  
□ English  
□ Other_____________  
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
3.) My work status: (check all that apply): 
 
□ Work outside of the home  
□ Stay at home mother/father  
□ Retired  
□ Unemployed  
□ Going to school  
□ Disabled 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
4.) Employment status: 
  
□ Full-time 
□ Part-time  
□ Seasonal 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
5.) Where were you born? 
 
Place__________________, country:________________________ 
 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
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6.) If you were not born in the United States, how long have you lived 
here? 
 
 □ Less than 1 year 
 □ 1-5 years 
 □ 6-10 years 
 □ more than 10 years 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
7.) How many children do you have? 
  
 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
8.) Do you work in agriculture? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
9.) Does your partner work in agriculture? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
10.) Seasonally or migrant? 
 
 □ Seasonally 
 □ Migrant 
 □ Not applicable 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
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11.) Do you have health insurance? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
12.) Do you have access to a car? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ Sometimes 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
13.) Do you ever have trouble getting to places or accesing services because 
you lack transportation? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
14.) Are you ever unable to go to the doctor? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
15.) If you answered yes to the previous question, why? Choose all that 
apply: 
 
    □ Lack of insurance 
    □ Lack of childcare 
    □ Lack of transportation 
    □ No doctors who speak my language 
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    □ Other, please specify _________________ 
    □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
16.) Do you ever avoid going to the doctor? 
 
 □ Yes 
 □ No 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
17.) If yes, why? 
 
 □ Feelings of discomfort, explain ___________________________ 
 □ Do not like the doctor 
 □ Documentation status 
 □ Not applicable 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
 
18.) Where do you go for healthcare? 
 
 _____________________________ 
 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
 
20.) Do you ever feel isolated from the rest of the Gettysburg community? 
 
 □ No 
 □ Sometimes, but not often 
 □ Frequently 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
21.) Have you ever felt anxious or sad due to: (choose all that apply) 
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□ Lack of money 
□ Family problems 
□ Feeling like you don’t belong 
□ Documentation status 
  □ Other 
 □ Not applicable 
 □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
 
22.) Rate your level of English: 
 
      □ No ability 
      □ A little bit 
      □ Enough to get around without problems 
      □ Yes, very well 
      □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with 
the survey. 
 
23.) Have you faced discrimination while in the United States? 
 
      □ Yes 
      □ No 
      □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with 
the survey. 
 
24.) Have you ever considered seeing a professional who has been trained 
to help people deal with stress, sadness, and similar problems? 
 
      □ Yes 
      □ No 
      □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with 
the survey. 
 
25.) If you have considered seeing a professional who has been trained to 
help people deal with stress, sadness, and similar problems and did not go, 
what stopped you? 
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      □ Feeling like I don’t need it 
      □ Fear of what others might think 
      □ None of my friends or family go to these doctors 
      □ No insurance or ability to pay 
      □ No way to get there 
      □ No childcare 
       □ Lack of availability of providers who speak my language 
      □ Other, please specify: _________________________ 
      □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with 
the survey. 
 
26.) Gender:  
 
□ Male □ Female □ Other 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
 
27.) Marital Status: 
 
 □ Married □ Divorced □ Separated □ Single □ Widowed □ Living 
with someone  
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
28.) Ethnicity: Do you consider yourself Hispanic/Latino?  
 
□ Yes □ No □ Don’t know  
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
29.) How long did you attend school for? 
 
      □ 1-5 years 
      □ 6-8 years 
      □ 9-12 years 
      □ More than 12 years 
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      □ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
30.) What is your average yearly household income? 
 
 □ Less than $20,000 
 □ $20,000 - $35,000 
 □ $35,000 - $50,000 
 □ $50,000 - $ 100,000 
 □ More than $ 100,000 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the 
survey. 
 
31.) Which category best describes your race? 
 
□ Indigenous (Indigeno) 
□ White  
□ Mixed race (Mestizo) 
□ Black or African American  
□ Asian  
□ Unavailable/Unknown 
□ Declined 
Other, please specify: ________________ 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
 
 
32.) Citizenship:  
 
□ US Citizen □ Permanent Resident □ Temporarily undocumented □ 
Refugee  
□ Other________ 
□ I choose not to answer this question, but I will continue with the survey. 
 
 
 
33.) Are you interested in speaking to a trained professional? 
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**If this survey has caused any feelings of discomfort and you would like to 
talk to someone about your feelings about this study, you are encouraged to 
contact Yeimi Gagliardi at 717 337 4264 Ext. 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 
Preguntas de la encuesta: 
 
1.) Al aceptar participar está indicando que tiene al menos 18 años, ha leído y 
entendido el formulario de consentimiento, y está de acuerdo en 
participar.  Por favor, no escriba su nombre en la encuesta. 
a. Sí 
 
2.) ¿Tiene médico de la familiar? 
 
□ Sí 
□ No 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
3.) Mi lenguaje de preferencia es: 
 
a. Español 
b. Inglés  
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c. Otro ___________ 
d. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
4.) Mi estado de empleo: 
 
a. Trabajo afuera de la casa 
b. Afuera de la casa principalmente 
c. Desempleada 
d. Jubilada 
e. Asisto a la escuela/universidad 
f. Incapacitada 
g. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
5.) Estado de empleo: 
 
a. Tiempo completo 
b. De medio tiempo 
c. Ninguno de los anteriores 
d. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
6.) ¿Dónde creció? (Ciudad, país) 
 
a. _____________________ ______ 
b. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
7.) Si no nació en los Estados Unidos, ¿cuánto tiempo ha vivido en los Estados 
Unidos? 
 
a. Menos de 1 año 
b. 1-5 años 
c. 6-10 años 
d. Más de 10 años 
e. Nací en los Estados Unidos 
f. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
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8.) ¿Cuántos hijos/as tiene? 
 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 
d. 3 
e. 4 
f. 5 
g. Más de 5 
h. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
9.) ¿Trabaja en la agricultura? 
 
a. Sí 
b. No 
c. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
10.) ¿Su pareja trabaja en agricultura? 
 
a. Sí 
b. No 
c. No aplicable 
d. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
11.)¿Estacionalmente o migratorio? 
 
 □ Estacionalmente 
 □ migratorio 
 □ Ninguno de los anteriores 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
12.)¿Tiene seguro de la salud? 
 
 □ Sí 
 □ No 
133 
 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
13.) ¿Tiene acceso a un vehículo? 
 
 □ Sí, siempre 
 □ A veces 
 □ Con poca frecuencia 
 □ Nunca 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
14.) ¿Le es difícil recibir servicios o ir a sitios a donde necesita ir por falta 
de transporte?  
 □ Sí 
 □ A veces 
 □ No/raramente 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
15.) ¿Tiene como llegar al médico? 
 □ Sí 
 □ No 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
16.) ¿Si su respuesta fue: NO, ¿por qué? Por favor, marque todas las 
dificultades que tiene: 
 □ Falta de seguro de la salud 
 □ Falta de cuidado de niños 
 □ Falta de transporte 
 □ No hay médicos que hablan mi idioma. 
 □ Otro, ¿Cuál?: ____________________ 
134 
 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
17.) ¿Ha dejado de ir al médico alguna vez? 
 □ Sí 
 □ No 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
18.) ¿Si su respuesta fue: sí, ¿por qué? Por favor marque todas las 
dificultades que tiene: 
 
 □ Se siente incomoda; ¿por qué? ______________ 
 □ No le gusta el/la médico/a 
 □ Mi estado de documentación  
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
19.) ¿A dónde va para obtener seguro de salud? 
 
__________________________________________ 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le encuesta. 
 
 
20.) ¿Alguna vez se siente aislado del resto de la comunidad del Condado 
de Adams? 
 
 □ No 
 □ A veces, pero no frecuentemente 
 □ Frecuentemente 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
21.) Alguna vez se sintió ansiosa o triste porque: (escoge todo que aplica) 
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 □ una falta de dinero 
 □ Los problemas de mi familia 
 □ Sentimientos de que no pertenezco 
 □ El estado de mi documentación 
 □ Otro 
 □ No aplicable 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
22.) ¿Evalúe su nivel de las inglés? 
 
 □ No sé nada de las inglés 
 □ Un poco de inglés 
 □ Sé inglés muy bien 
 □ Lo suficiente como para poder moverme 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
23.) ¿Se ha sentido discriminado en los Estados Unidos? 
 
 □ Sí 
 □ No 
 □ No estoy seguro 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
24.) ¿Alguna vez has considerado hablar con un profesional entrenado en 
ayudar personas que sufren de la ansiedad, la tristeza, el estrés, y problemas 
similares? 
 □ Sí 
 □ No 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
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25.) ¿Si has considerado lo anterior, ¿qué la detuvo? 
 
 □ No necesito hablar con un profesional 
 □ Miedo de lo que otros pueden pensar. 
 □ Nunca nadie de mis amigos o miembros de la familia ha ido a 
estos profesionales 
 □ No seguro de salud o inhabilidad a pagar 
 □ No modo a llegar allí. 
 □ Falta de cuidado para los niños 
 □ Falta de proveedores que hablen mi idioma 
 □ Otro, especifique ____________________________ 
 □ Nunca he pensando en esto 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
26.) Mi género: 
 
 □ Varón 
 □ Hembra 
 □ Otro 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
27.) El estado de marital: 
 
 □ Casada 
 □ Divorciada 
 □ Separada 
 □ Sola 
 □ Enviudada 
 □ Viviendo con un parejo 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
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28.) Identidad étnica: ¿Se considera hispánica/latina? 
 
 □ Sí 
 □ No 
 □ No disponible/desconocido 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
29.) ¿Cuantos años asistió a la escuela? 
 
 □ Menos de 1 año 
 □ 1-5 años 
 □ 6-8 años 
 □ 9-12 años 
 □ Más de 12 años 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
30.) ¿Qué se considera? 
 
 □ Indígena (India) 
 □ Blanca 
 □ Mestiza 
 □ Negra 
 □ No disponible/desconocido 
 □ Rechazo 
 □ Otro, especifica ____________________ 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
31.) ¿Qué es el ingreso promedio de tu hogar cada año? 
 
a. Menos de $20,000 
b. 20,000 - $35,000 
c. $35,000 - $50,000 
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d. $50,000 - $ 100,000 
e. Más de $100,000 
f. No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
32.) Estado migratorio: 
 
 □ EEUU ciudadana 
 □ Residente permanente 
 □ Temporalmente no documentada 
 □ Refugiada 
 □ Otro 
□ No deseo contestar esta pregunta, pero quiero seguir con le 
encuesta. 
 
 
33.) ¿Tienes interés en hablar con un o una profesional?  
  □ Sí 
  □ No 
 
 
**Si el sondeo te causas sentimientos de incómodo y te gustaría hablar 
con alguien sobre tus sentimientos, te alientas a contactar Yeimi 
Gagliardi al 717 337 4264 Ext. 6  
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Annex 3 
 
 
Table 1.) Do you have a family doctor? 
 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 37 
No 13 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
(Total) 50 
 
Table 2.) My language preference 
 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Spanish 46 
English 4 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Other 1 
(Total) 51 
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Table 3.) My state of employment 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
I don’t work outside the home 13 
I work outside of the home 31 
Retired 2 
Student 1 
Disabled/incapacitated 0 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
(Total) 47 
 
 
Table 4.) Employment frequency: 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Full time 25 
Part time 7 
Neither of the above 4 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
(Total) 36 
 
Table 5.) Where were you born? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Mexico 34 
Puerto Rico 4 
Guatemala 1 
Colombia 2 
United States 5 
Total 46 
 
 
Table 6.) If you were not born in the U.S., how long have you lived here? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Less than 1 year 1 
1-5 years 3 
6-10 years 6 
More than 10 years 37 
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I was born in the U.S. 0 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 47 
 
 
Table 7.) How many children do you have? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
0 0 
1 4 
2 16 
3 16 
4 10 
5 2 
More than 5 1 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 49 
 
 
Table 8.) Do you work in agriculture? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 10 
No 35 
I don’t want to answer this question 1 
Total 46 
 
Table 9.) Does your partner work in agriculture? 
 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 13 
No 27 
I don’t want to answer this question 2 
Total 42 
 
 
 
Table 10.) Do you have health insurance? 
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Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 30 
No 16 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 46 
 
 
Table 11.) Do you have access to a vehicle? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes, always 37 
Sometimes 8 
Rarely 2 
Never 1 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 48 
 
 
Table 12.) Is it difficult to receive services or go to places where you need to go 
due to lack of transportation? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 7 
Sometimes 12 
No/rarely 25 
I don’t want to answer this question 1 
Total 45 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13.) Can you get to a doctor? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 47 
No 2 
I don’t want to answer this question 1 
Total 50 
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Table 14.) If your response was no, why? Choose all that apply. 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Lack of health insurance 3 
Lack of childcare 0 
Lack of transportation 3 
No doctors that speak my language 1 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 7 
 
 
Table 15.) Have you stopped going to the doctor at some point? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 19 
No 29 
I don’t want to answer this question 1 
Total 49 
 
 
Table 16.) If your response was yes, why? Choose all that apply? 
 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
I don’t like the doctor 0 
I don’t have money to pay 6 
My legal status 1 
I don’t want to answer this question 1 
Total 12 (see additional responses below) 
 
I felt uncomfortable (explain why): 
 
Response 1 I don’t have money to pay, and my legal 
status 
Response 2 Lack of health insurance 
Response 3 I don’t speak English 
Response 4 I don’t have money to pay, and my legal 
documentation 
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Table 17.) Have you ever felt isolated from the rest of the Adams Community? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
No 33 
Sometimes 13 
Frequently 3 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 49 
 
 
Table 18.) Have you ever felt anxious or sad because: (choose all that apply) 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Lack of money 7 
Family problems 10 
Feelings that I don’t belong 1 
State of my documentation 8 
Other 7 
I don’t want to answer this question 5 
Total 34 
 
 
Table 19.) Evaluate your level of English: 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
I don’t know any English 12 
A little bit of English 26 
Enough to get by 1 
I know English very well 8 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 47 
 
 
Table 20.) Have you felt discriminated against in the United States? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 20 
No 21 
I’m not sure 8 
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I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 49 
 
Table 21.) Have you ever considered talking with a professional trained to help 
people that suffer from anxiety, sadness, stress, and similar problems? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Yes 15 
No 34 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 49 
 
 
Table 22.) If you have considered the above, what stopped you? Choose all that 
apply. 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
I don’t know where to go 8 
I don’t need to talk with a professional 1 
I fear what others could think 0 
None of my friends/family see these 
kinds of professionals 
1 
I don’t have money to pay 3 
I don’t know how to get there 2 
Lack of child care 2 
Lack of providers that speak my 
language 
6 
I have never thought about seeing 
someone 
2 
Other 2 
I don’t want to answer this question 2 
Total 19 
 
 
Table 23.) My marital state: 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Married 29 
Divorced 4 
Separated 3 
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Single 5 
Living with a partner 6 
I don’t want to answer this question 1 
Total 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24.) How many years did you attend school? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Less than 1 year 1 
1-5 years 3 
6-8 years 12 
9-12 years 16 
More than 12 years 15 
I don’t want to answer this question 0 
Total 47 
 
 
Table 25.) What is your average annual income? 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
Less than $20,000 11 
$20,000-35,000 14 
$35,000-50,000 7 
$50,000-100,000 7 
More than 100,000 0 
I don’t want to answer this question 2 
Total 41 
 
 
Table 26.) Migratory status: 
 
Answer Choices Responses (# of women) 
U.S. Citizen 17 
Permanent Resident 10 
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Temporarily Undocumented 5 
Refugee 0 
Tourist 1 
Other 4 
I don’t want to answer this question 5 
Total 42 
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Operation Boulder, a United States government surveillance program 
deployed in 1972 under the direction of then-President Richard M. Nixon, 
launched a large-scale federal investigation of both Arab immigrants to the U.S. 
and Arab-Americans.
1
 In this context, the term “Arab” is used to mean a person 
originating from an Arabic-speaking country in the Middle East or North Africa, 
while “Arab-American” refers to a person of Arab lineage who was born in the 
United States. For the purposes of this paper, the Arabs and Arab-Americans 
referred to are only those residing in the United States. Before the project was 
canceled due to its overuse of resources, Operation Boulder led to the 
investigation of 150,000 Arabs.
2
 During the operation, government agents 
employed invasive and discriminatory tactics in their investigations of Arab 
immigrants and Arab-Americans. Further, a combination of historical evidence 
and contemporary analysis indicates that these federal investigations intended to 
suppress and divide Arab communities. However, though the U.S. government 
was able to dampen community activity initially, their surveillance tactics 
ultimately resulted in mobilization and cooperation within the Arab community in 
the U.S., resulting in a strengthened ethnic and cultural identity. 
U.S. GOVERNMENT TACTICS 
                                                        
1
 Michael R. Fischbach, "Government Pressures against Arabs in the United States," Journal of 
Palestine Studies 14, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 88-89, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536955. 
2
 Middle East Research and Information Project, "Operation Boulder Ended," MERIP Reports 37 
(May 1975): 32, JSTOR. 
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A collaboration between United States government agencies employed a 
wide variety of tactics to intimidate, harass, and surveil Arab-Americans. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Internal Revenue Service, State Department, and 
U.S. Customs Service collaborated on a large-scale investigation targeting Arabs 
in America, both immigrants and Arab-Americans. The initial tactic used to ramp 
up surveillance in the early stages of Operation Boulder was a tightening of 
immigration and visa requirements: the United States government required Arab 
immigrants and Arab-Americans who travelled internationally to obtain transit 
visas. Though government officials originally promised that these regulations 
would only affect those suspected of terrorism, the restrictions were applied to 
Arabs writ large, regardless of their criminal history. This spillover indicated a 
future trend of ostensibly innocent immigrants and Arab-Americans being 
surveilled and targeted based on their national origins alone. Travel and 
immigration restrictions soon expanded beyond a simple requirement for special 
visas: Arab immigrants began to face extra screening when trying to enter the 
United States, which resulted in some visa requests being denied. Further, 
government agents utilized this additional screening as an opportunity to uncover 
small technical errors in the previously approved visa applications of Arabs now 
living in the U.S. The discovery of these errors was used as justification to deport 
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Arab immigrants, though such technical inconsistencies had previously been 
overlooked in immigration processes.
3
 
 U.S. government agencies also employed more invasive tactics in their 
investigation of Arabs living in the U.S. For instance, in the case of the Arab 
attorney Abdeen Jabara, government officials used wiretaps as part of “an 
intensive harassment campaign” that lasted nine years.4 Further, officials also 
aggressively questioned Arab-Americans, even those not suspected of any crime. 
FBI officers made practice of arriving at the homes of Arab-Americans in the 
early hours of the morning and demanding that Arab-Americans submit to an 
interrogation immediately, often justifying their actions to subjects and their 
families with false statements that the person being questioned was suspected of 
involvement in an anti-United States organization. The government officials also 
used exploitative tactics during interrogations, such as lying to detainees and 
telling them they would not need a lawyer. Finally, the U.S. government even 
went so far as to organize burglaries to steal intelligence on investigation targets. 
For instance, the FBI carried out a burglary on the office of a leader of the Arab 
Information Center and allegedly stole the names of the Center’s agents.5 Federal 
use of exploitative tactics to gain information about the U.S. Arab community 
                                                        
3
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 91.  
4
 Ibid., 89-91. 
5
 Ibid. 
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sowed fear among Arab immigrants and Arab-Americans and provided federal 
investigators with an ever-growing pool of targets. 
JUSTIFICATION OF TACTICS 
The United States government justified its surveillance of Arab-Americans 
by asserting that this oversight was necessary to protect the security of U.S. 
citizens of Israeli background.
6
 Government officials bolstered this claim by 
pointing to the “Palestinian commando action” that occurred at the 1972 Olympic 
games in Munich.
7
 At the Olympics, a Palestinian terrorist group took members of 
the Israeli Olympic team hostage, killing some and then engaging in a firefight 
that left the remainder of the Israeli athletes dead.
8
 Representatives of the U.S. 
government argued that the Munich attacks could be attributed to “Arab history 
and tradition of extremism and violence which has contributed the word assassin 
to the international lexicon.”9 Therefore, officials posited, surveillance of Arab-
Americans was necessary to prevent Munich’s violence from being replicated on 
U.S. soil. 
However, both data available in the early 1970s and the information that 
emerged from Operation Boulder indicate that the above justifications lack merit. 
                                                        
6
 Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 89 
7
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In 1972, there were no acts of terrorism that were verified as having been 
perpetrated by Arab-Americans, suggesting that there was no precedent for the 
U.S. to initiate such an extensive domestic surveillance program.
10
 In addition, 
through every investigation that was instigated under Operation Boulder, zero 
violations of United States law were ever discovered.
11
 Because the surveillance 
campaign was both groundless and fruitless, contemporary and current minority 
advocates argued that other motivations had given rise to Operation Boulder.  
TRUE MOTIVATIONS 
Pro-Israeli movements likely contributed to the perpetration of Operation 
Boulder, though the U.S. government preferred to emphasize the national security 
justifications for the surveillance program. The timing of a Zionist information 
campaign against Arab immigrants provides support for the assertion that the U.S. 
utilized Operation Boulder to strengthen its ties to pro-Israeli advocate groups. 
Shortly before the surveillance operation was launched, Zionist organizations 
based in the United States warned authorities that Palestinians associated with 
Arab guerilla warriors could be among the immigrants and Arab-Americans 
pursuing education in the United States. Around the same time, Near East Report, 
                                                        
10
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a Zionist lobbying organization, publicly reported that Arab students were 
circulating Palestinian “propaganda” in the U.S.12 As the operation progressed, 
the United States government explicitly acknowledged that it was collaborating 
with the Israeli government on Operation Boulder, and domestic Zionist groups 
such as the Jewish Defense League boasted close involvement with the 
surveillance campaign.
13
 In additional, bidirectional information exchanges 
between pro-Israel lobbies and U.S. government officials reinforced the political 
motivations behind Operation Boulder. Up to two years before the operation was 
launched, U.S. government officials sought information on Arab political 
activism, and some of the first sources they turned to were U.S.-based Zionist 
organizations.
14
 Conversely, as Operation Boulder progressed, government 
agencies often provided American pro-Israel groups with information on 
prominent Arab-American political activists.
15
 Evidence of communication and 
collaboration between U.S. officials and Zionist groups aligns with the logic of 
the situation: pro-Israel forces would, naturally, want Palestinian activists in the 
U.S. to be surveiled. Intelligence gathering on Arabs would benefit the Israeli side 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by providing insider insight into Arab political 
activism and strategy. Further, the fear of prosecution by U.S. officials likely 
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deterred Arab-Americans from political activity, which would benefit the Israeli 
side of the political equation. 
Suppression of Arab political activity was also a prominent, though 
unspoken, goal of Operation Boulder. Arab-Americans engaged in political 
activity with the goals of influencing both domestic and foreign policy, as 
liberalizing immigration laws convinced many Arab-Americans that “interest 
group politics” could lead the U.S. to pursue a “more even-handed approach to 
the Middle East.”16 Organizations such as the National Association of Arab-
Americans focused on pressing the U.S. government to back Palestinian interests 
in the Middle East. They believed that tolerance for Arabs abroad would spill over 
to expanded rights for Arab-Americans.
17
 Other political groups focused on 
improving the welfare of Arabs in America, and they pursued this goal by 
engaging in the political process and rising within the government.
18
 The United 
States, partially because they backed Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
did not want pro-Palestinian forces pressuring them or rising in their ranks, 
supported the suppression of this political activity. Michael Fischbach posits that 
surveillance was used first to scope out, then to flatten, the Arab-American 
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political landscape. He notes that U.S. government surveillance focused on the 
extent of the associations between Arab-Americans and “Arab political 
organizations abroad.” In-person surveillance and interviews that took place in 
Arab enclaves allowed the FBI to gather information on the political atmospheres 
and leaders of certain communities.
 
Fischbach suggests that the U.S. government 
was deeply concerned about Palestinian influences on U.S. politics and society, 
writing, “[T]he latter concern, that of Arab viewpoints reaching American ears, 
was of equal concern as alleged security threats.” 19 Michael Suleiman argues that 
tactics such as early-morning visits and interrogations were intended to create a 
“chilling effect,” and that they “intended to intimidate and silence political debate 
about Middle East issues.”20 The focus on politically active Arabs instead of any 
actual perpetrators of  violence combined with the imposing tactics employed 
suggests that U.S. government interests were political, not security-related. 
Further, the surveillance’s focus on discovery of more targets and its failure to 
uncover any evidence of legal violations by Arabs in the U.S. indicate that the 
core goal of Operation Boulder was creating enough fear to suppress, or chill, 
Arab political activity. 
Another clandestine objective of Operation Boulder consisted of 
destroying Arab networks of internal community support: government officials 
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20
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used targeted tactics in order to entice Arab-Americans to turn on one another, 
effectively deconstructing communities. For instance, when U.S. officials visited 
Arab-Americans’ houses and demanded to begin interrogations, they questioned 
not only their target but also the family and friends of the target. This mode of 
questioning encouraged Arab-Americans to report any possible wrongdoings of 
their own close relations, as well as shifting blame and resentment towards the 
original target for supposedly causing the poor treatment enacted by government 
officials.
21
 Younger Arabs faced even further pressure to report the activities of 
those they knew due to the career- and life-altering threat of being deported 
before obtaining a university degree.
22
 Via these tactics, U.S. government officials 
intended to build up a “network of informers” to assist their investigations. 
Government agencies intended not only to separate communities in order to 
inhibit the formation of political momentum, but also to alienate Arab-Americans 
involved in politics from the rest of the Arab-American community that formed 
their possible support base.
23
 Operation Boulder’s aims to undercut community 
ties serve as another method of creating a chilling effect, as the destruction of 
communities tends to inhibit mobilization towards political activity.  
Some separation of communities did happen through Operation Boulder’s 
successful cultivation of a network of informants. A number of Arab-Americans, 
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either because they did not know the law or because they believed they had 
nothing to hide, complied with illegal lines of questioning and implicated people 
close to them, leading to a cycle of more and more illicit interrogations.
24
 As a 
result of intimidation tactics applied by the federal government, pressure and 
subsequently shame circulated about the Arab-American community and threated 
to close down Arab-focused sources of scholarship. For instance, many university 
cultural and intellectual programs that studied the Middle East faced pressure to 
close down due to the intense scrutiny being applied to their activities and those 
of their scholars. The assumption that Arab scholarly views were unreliable or 
unsound stemmed from the U.S. government’s concerted effort to discredit pro-
Arab political views, and this doubt decreased the scholarship produced by the 
Arab-American community.
25
 
 However, though something of a chilling effect was achieved, the U.S. 
government ultimately failed in tearing apart Arab-American communities: 
overall, political mobilization and community cohesion resulted from Operation 
Boulder. Originally, the generation of Arab-Americans and Arab immigrants that 
was affected by Operation Boulder lacked a substantial ethnic identity. Instead, 
the most prominent characteristic shared by Arab-Americans in the 1970s was 
their assimilation into American culture, and most Arab-American communities 
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held only fractured pieces of their cultural identities.
26
 As a result, most Arab-
Americans shared few characteristics with one another and experienced a general 
separation. However, Michael Fischbach writes that this disconnect was 
overcome by the Arab-American response to Operation Boulder: Arab 
organizations and Arabs in the U.S. banded together to protest the surveillance as 
a form of discrimination and a violation of rights.
27
 The community response was 
characterized by an unprecedented cooperation between political, social, and 
cultural Arab organizations. For instance, members of the Association of Arab-
American University Graduates (AAUG) published an ad in the New York Times 
condemning Operation Boulder as discriminatory. Even Arab organizations that 
had never before engaged in political activities and did not focus on Middle-
Eastern issues, such as Arab-American social clubs, attached their names in 
support of the advertisement. Elaine Hagopian attributes this change to the 
organizations’ perceived “responsibility to the community,” suggesting that the 
events of Operation Boulder connected organizations to new causes and created a 
cohesive Arab-American community.
28
 Other organizations took on roles beyond 
their original intentions in order to help foster and protect the Arab-American 
community. For instance, the members of the AAUG with legal training formed a 
committee on civil rights to combat illegal harassment. Although the AAUG 
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never intended to be a body that dispensed legal advice, the pressure exacted by 
the U.S. government motivated AAUG members to pool resources and provide 
services to the Arab-American community.
29
 Changes such as those that occurred 
within the AAUG indicated organizations’ willingness to expand beyond their 
original missions in the service of the broader Arab community, suggesting more 
community cohesion and cooperation. 
 Overall, the U.S. government deployed surveillance tools under Operation 
Boulder in a targeted effort to appease Zionist interests by destroying Arab-
American political activity and community networks. Though some degree of a 
chilling effect did occur, the discriminatory practices perpetrated by Operation 
Boulder eventually led a previously fractured and disconnected immigrant group 
to band together in solidarity, create resilient social and political networks, and 
formally protest the actions of the U.S. federal government.  
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In recent years, discussions of gun violence have appeared frequently in 
the media. Debates on how the government should address gun violence- if at all- 
have become key points in political campaigns. Amidst the heated discussion, 
politicians, journalists and others risk oversimplifying or ignoring key aspects of 
this issue. Gun violence includes a broad range of activity, and is related to a 
variety of other issues in complex ways. Policymakers need to carefully examine 
those relationships to develop effective solutions. 
One foundational question to examine is whether gun violence is a serious 
national issue. Based on historical trends, the current level of gun violence in the 
United States is nothing remarkable. According to data from Pew, the rate of 
overall gun deaths is lower than it was in 1993 by 31%- almost a third.  The gun 
homicide rate fell from 7.0 to 3.4 per 100,000 people between 1993 and 2000, and 
has leveled off since then (Krogstad 2015). Although the firearm suicide rate is 
also lower now than it was in 1993, it has been rising in recent years and is now 
considerably higher than the homicide rate, at 6.7 deaths per 100,000 people.  
Although the gun violence rates we are experiencing are not 
unprecedented in our country’s history, they are unusual in a global context. This 
becomes clear when United States gun violence rates are compared with those of 
other countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), a coalition of nations which conduct economic policy research and work 
to improve global living standards. Figures 1 and 2 compare rates of firearm and 
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non-firearm homicide and suicide across OECD countries which the World Bank 
defines as “high income”. Because they have very small populations, Iceland and 
Luxembourg are not included. The United States leads the field in both 
categories: its firearm homicide rate of 3.6 is more than five times that of the 
next- highest, Canada and Portugal at 0.5, and its firearm suicide rate of 6.3 is 
nearly twice that of Finland’s at 3.3. Compared with these other high-income 
countries, gun violence is clearly a problem in the United States. 
This large amount of gun deaths contributes to an unusually high overall 
homicide rate. The United States has a total homicide rate of 5.3; the next highest, 
Finland, has a rate of only 1.5. The non-firearm homicide rate is also higher in the 
United States than in most of these other countries - only the Czech Republic has 
a higher rate - indicating that guns are not the only problem. However, the 
disparity in gun homicide rates is far more extreme:  homicides by guns 
specifically need more attention in the United States (Grynshteyn 2016). 
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Figure 1 
Source: Grynshteyn and Hemenway 2016 
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Figure 2 
Source: Grynshteyn and Hemenway 2016 
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Figure 3 
Source: FBI 2013 
It is especially important to note that the gun suicide rate in the United 
States is much higher than the gun homicide rate: Americans with guns pose more 
of a threat to themselves than anyone else. Although homicide appears to be more 
of a problem in the United States compared with other countries, suicide causes 
many more deaths per year than homicide does and therefore deserves greater 
attention. The overall suicide rate in the United States falls in the middle of the 
pack: apparently, Americans do not have an unusual tendency to commit suicide. 
If gun suicide rates can be reduced without being replaced by other methods, 
specifically targeting guns could significantly reduce suicides.  
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Recently, much media and political attention has been devoted to mass 
shootings. To investigate the impacts of public shootings, including mass 
shootings, the FBI has conducted a study on “active shooter incidents,” in which 
police are asked to respond to a shooting in progress in a populated area. The 
frequency of these events may be on the rise: the FBI finds a progressive increase 
in the number of active shooter incidents per year and the number of fatalities 
between 2000 and 2013 (2013a:8-9). Figure 3 shows the number of active shooter 
events and the number of casualties reported to the FBI each year, and increasing 
trends over time. However, these events are not representative of most gun 
violence in the United States.  Although the apparent increase in active shooter 
incidents is concerning, overemphasis on this issue threatens to draw public 
attention from more common incidents. 
 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENCE 
Mental Illness 
Politicians and the media frequently associate gun violence with mental 
illness. Their concern is not completely unfounded, as mental illness can increase 
the risk of violence. A 1990 survey by the National Institute of Mental Health 
Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) found that 2% of those without a mental 
illness had committed violent acts within the past year, compared with 7% to 8% 
for those with severe mental illness (Swanson 2015:367). Similarly, Van Dorn et 
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al. argue that “most researchers have concurred that a modest but statistically 
significant relationship exists between violence and [severe mental illness]” 
(2012:495). However, the ECA study also found that only 4% of the risk of 
violence in the United States could be attributed to mental illness alone. This 
means that even if the violence rate among those with severe mental illness were 
reduced, 96% of violent crimes would not be affected (2015:368).  
Other factors complicate the link between violence and mental illness. 
Van Dorn et al. include substance abuse disorders in their analysis and find that 
there is a stronger association between severe mental illness and violence when 
substance abuse is involved (2012:501). They also point out that people may not 
have these disorders for their entire lives, and their analysis only considers those 
who have had symptoms of the disorder within the past year. When they make 
this qualification, they find a much stronger relationship than when those who 
have had a mental disorder in their lifetime, but may no longer experience 
symptoms, are included. This is an important consideration for developing 
policies: if restrictions on access to firearms are to be imposed at all, it might 
make sense to base them on recent experiences of mental illness rather than past 
diagnoses.  
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Figure 4 
Sources: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2012, Drapeau 
and McIntosh 2016 
The exact suicide rate for each of these populations is uncertain; the 
above chart presents midrange estimates from a variety of studies. 
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Mental Illness and Risk of Death By Suicide 
Regardless of its association with homicide, mental illness is a critical 
factor in suicide risk. The vast majority of suicide victims- about 90%- are 
diagnosed with a mental illness (Dragisic et al 2015:188). Risk of suicide is 
considerably higher among those who experience depression. Studies have found 
that between 2.2% and 15% of this population eventually die by suicide, as shown 
in Figure 4 (Friedman and Leon 2007). Those with other mental disorders are also 
at increased risk: it is estimated that nearly 5% of those with schizophrenia die by 
suicide; that rate is 3 to 10% among those with borderline personality disorder 
and 15 to 19% for those with bipolar disorder type I or II (U.S. Department of 
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Health and Human Services 2012:115-118). By comparison, suicide causes 1.6% 
of deaths nationally (Drapeau and McIntosh 2016). It is important to consider 
mental illness when designing gun control policies, not because people with 
mental illness are dangerous to others, but because they are at a much greater risk 
of self-harm.  
Social Surroundings 
Gun violence results from a combination of individual characteristics with 
multiple environmental influences. According to the American Psychological 
Association (APA), “gun violence is associated with a confluence of individual, 
family, school, peer, community, and sociocultural risk factors that interact over 
time during childhood and adolescence.” Because the influences of so many 
people and institutions are at play, it is impossible to pinpoint which people will 
ultimately commit violent acts. However, examining which environmental factors 
increase risk may help us develop safer communities. Citing a wealth of studies, 
the APA identifies several specific conditions which may contribute to the 
development of violent behavior. The influence of parents is critical: “low parent–
child synchrony and warmth, poor or disrupted attachment, harsh or inconsistent 
discipline (overly strict or permissive), poor parental monitoring, the modeling of 
antisocial behavior, pro-violent attitudes and criminal justice involvement, and 
coercive parent–child interaction patterns” all contribute to children’s risk of 
developing violent behaviors (Dodge and Pettit 2003; Farrington et al. 2001; Hill 
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et al. 1999; Patterson, Forgatch and DeGarmo 2010). The APA also highlights the 
importance of the school environment, pointing out that schools in less affluent 
communities tend to have fewer resources to address their students’ needs. They 
also tend to have strict disciplinary policies and may not have the information to 
address “problem behaviors” effectively (Edelman 2007). As a result, the students 
most likely to become involved in violence may find themselves without support 
and opportunities to find a better path. The community atmosphere is also crucial: 
people must have access to basic resources and positive personal relationships and 
feel that their personal safety is secure. High levels of violent activity in a 
community provide more opportunities for youth to engage in that behavior, and 
low availability of resources limits opportunities to develop positive, non-violent 
attitudes and skills. 
Availability of Guns 
Access to firearms is an especially important factor in the United States. 
Compared with the OECD countries discussed earlier, the United States has a 
much higher gun ownership rate, with 88.8 guns per 100 people. The next highest 
is Finland, with 45.3 guns per 100 people (Rogers 2012). The fact that the United 
States has both the highest gun ownership rate and the highest gun violence rates 
seems to indicate a relationship between those two factors. If the two variables are 
related, however, then higher gun ownership rates should correspond to higher 
gun violence rates among other countries as well. The United States is such an 
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Figure 5 
Sources: Grynshteyn 2016, Rogers 2012 
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outlier that it makes the correlation appear stronger than it really is. When the 
United States is removed from the dataset, a scatterplot of gun ownership rates 
and gun homicide rates among all other countries in the study reveals a very weak 
relationship, as shown in Figure 5. Although gun ownership may contribute to the 
homicide rate in the United States, it clearly is not the only factor. The 
relationship between gun ownership and gun suicides is much stronger; even with 
the United States removed from the dataset, there is a clear positive correlation, as 
shown in Figure 6. Access to guns seems to increase the threat we pose to 
ourselves, rather than each other (Grynshteyn 2016; Rogers 2012).  
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Figure 6 
Source: Grynshteyn 2016, Rogers 2012 
Which policies would be most effective? 
A 2003 review of studies on firearm policy by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) reveals that findings are conflicted. They advise 
that there is not enough evidence to determine how the reviewed policies affect 
gun violence. These include laws that restrict access for certain people, impose 
waiting periods, require licensing and registration, or mandate that a concealed 
carry permit be granted to any qualified applicant. The CDC notes that the data 
and methodology used in many studies are flawed and stresses the need for 
“further high-quality research” (Hahn et al 2003). It has been difficult to complete 
such research because of a 1996 law which prohibits the CDC from putting funds 
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toward the promotion of gun control. In response, the CDC has almost completely 
avoided gun research (Kurtzleban 2016). A logical starting point to addressing 
gun violence would be to remove these restrictions so that we have more sound 
research on which to base our policies.                                                   
 Independent research does indicate that many of the recent, highly 
publicized policy proposals in response to mass shooting incidents might not do 
much good.  For example, assault weapons and LCMs seem to be a logical target 
for regulation because they enable someone to kill large numbers of people very 
quickly. A national ban on several types of assault weapons, passed in 1994, 
expired in 2004; however, a renewal of the ban might not have made a significant 
difference. According to most estimates, assault weapons were only used in 2% of 
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gun crimes before the ban. Large capacity magazines (LCMs) posed a much more 
significant problem, as they were used in 14-26% of gun crimes before the ban 
was implemented. Although the ban was followed by a further decrease in assault 
weapons used in crimes, research conducted in Baltimore, Milwaukee, Louisville 
and Anchorage found that they were replaced by increased use of LCMs. These 
results suggest that a ban on LCMs might do more to prevent violence than a ban 
on assault weapons. However, the authors suggest that for many crimes the use of 
LCMs might not increase the number of casualties (Koper et al. 2004). In  
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addition, such a regulation would not affect the majority of gun crimes. In 2013, 
for example, 70% of firearm homicides were committed with handguns (Figure 
7).  
Politicians and the media have also focused on heavily restricting gun 
access for the mentally ill. Given the low percentage of homicides that involve 
mental illness, restrictions purported to protect the public from those with 
“dangerous” mental illnesses may do more to stigmatize innocent people than 
they would to save lives. However, the role that mental illness plays in suicide 
deserves attention. Expanded background checks could be a useful mechanism to 
avoid providing guns to those at risk of suicide.  
The APA also points out that the most reliable predictor of gun violence is 
violence committed in the past. More consistent background checks on criminal 
records would help reduce access to guns for these at-risk individuals, regardless 
of their mental health status. Recent studies have linked a 1995 permit-to-
purchase law in Connecticut with a 40% reduction in gun homicides, and the 
repeal of a similar Missouri law in 2007 with a 23% increase in gun homicides 
(Rudolph et al. 2015, Webster and Wintemute 2015). These laws required a 
background check as part of a permit-issuing process, so they may have had a 
different effect from background checks alone. Daniel Webster, who collaborated 
on both studies, points out that the permit requirement in itself may have 
discouraged illegal purchases (Kurtzleben 2016). Regardless, the study results 
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indicate that the passage of similar laws could help prevent gun violence in the 
future. 
Another promising policy is the implementation of waiting periods, which 
require a delay between the purchase of a gun and its delivery. This policy aims to 
obstruct spur-of-the-moment, emotional decisions to kill oneself or others. After 
the passage of a few days, the rage or depression which inspired the purchaser’s 
lethal intentions might have passed.  Luca et al. argue that waiting periods can 
significantly reduce homicides and may also help prevent suicides. In their 
research, they compare changes in homicide and suicide rates in states that have 
implemented waiting period laws to changes in other states during the same 
period. They associate waiting periods with a 17% reduction in homicides. They 
also find a 7-11% reduction in suicides. However, they caution that the difference 
in suicides may result from other variables, and that a reduction in gun suicides 
may only be replaced with suicides by other means (2017:2). 
One of the most striking risk factors in the United States is the availability 
of guns. Australia’s gun policy passed in 1996 is a drastic example of an attempt 
to curb this factor. In response to a mass shooting in 1996, Australia implemented 
a “gun buyback,” which encouraged Australians to turn in their guns for smelting. 
Although there is no record of exactly how many guns were destroyed, it is likely 
that the number of guns in the country was reduced by one third (Alpers 2013). 
One study finds that, in the following years, firearm death rates in Australia 
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dropped by half (Alpers and Rosetti 2018). Another finds that the suicide rate was 
reduced by 80%, and the homicide rate saw a similar decrease (Leigh and Neill 
2010). There were eleven mass shootings in the ten years before the new policy 
was implemented, and there has not been another since (Chapman and Alpers 
2006). This policy might not be so successful in the United States, given the 
tenacity with which many on the far right cling to their gun ownership rights. 
However, its apparent success demonstrates what might happen if the excessive 
stock of civilian-owned firearms were to be reduced. 
The most effective policies to address gun violence may not directly 
pertain to gun control. The research highlighted by the APA indicates that people 
are far more likely to commit gun violence when they feel unsafe and unwanted, 
and when they lack sufficient opportunities to improve their lives. Policies that 
fund schools in low-income neighborhoods, help families support their children 
and help local communities support their members can all help to decrease the 
risk of violence. When life conditions are better overall, Americans are less likely 
to feel that violence is necessary. 
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